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Demystifying Legal Reasoning

Legal reasoning, meaning reasoning about the requirements
and application of law, has been studied for centuries.1

This is

not surprising: legal decisionmaking is tremendously important to
peace, prosperity, human dignity, and daily life.

Yet, at least

since Sir Edward Coke described the common law as “an artificial
perfection of reason,” legal reasoning has been surrounded by an
air of mystery.2

More recent works on legal reasoning have

produced neither clarity nor consensus on what legal deliberation
entails; if anything, they have compounded the problem.

Legal

decisionmaking is frequently described as a “craft” involving
special forms of reasoning that are accessible only to those with
long experience in applying law.3

Seasoned judges and lawyers

are said to reason analogically from one case to another and to
discover or construct “legal principles” that differ from the
moral principles that govern decisionmaking in other areas of
life.4
Our own contribution to the subject of legal reasoning is
fairly simple: we believe that legal reasoning is ordinary
reasoning applied to legal problems.5

Legal decisionmakers

engage in open-ended moral reasoning, empirical reasoning, and
deduction from authoritative rules.

These are the same modes of

reasoning that all actors use in deciding what to do.
1

Popular

descriptions of additional forms of reasoning special to law are,
in our view, simply false.
outcomes of new disputes.
possible.

Past results cannot determine the
Analogical reasoning, as such, is not

Legal principles are both logically incoherent and

normatively unattractive.

Nor do legal decisionmakers engage in

special modes of interpreting texts.

To the extent that judges

purport to discern meanings in legal texts that differ from the
meanings intended by the authors of those texts, they are making
rather than interpreting law.6
We recognize that, as a descriptive matter, legal actors
purport to apply special decisionmaking techniques.

They study

prior outcomes, seek analogies, and search for principles.

We

offer a limited defense of traditional legal methods of this
kind.

Our defense, however, is indirect, based on the capacity

of traditional methods to counteract the situational
disadvantages that affect judges as appliers of rules and as
rulemakers for future cases.

We explain these techniques as

ingrained practices that may have instrumental value for
imperfect reasoners, not as specialized forms of reasoning.
Part I describes the circumstances that give rise to law and
sets out our understanding of the most important problems of
jurisprudence.

This is familiar ground but nevertheless

important as background for our analysis of legal reasoning.
will be clear, we owe significant debts to others who have
2

As

studied the subjects we address here, in particular H.L.A. Hart
and Frederick Schauer.7
Part II addresses legal reasoning in the application and
development of common law.
the book.

We have several aims in this part of

We hope to clarify the reasoning methods judges use,

to demonstrate that a variety of other supposed methods of legal
decisionmaking are illusory, and to explain the different roles
judges occupy within the legal system, as adjudicators and as
lawmakers.

In presenting our view of what common law reasoning

entails, we face a descriptive problem: courts often insist that
they are reasoning in ways that we say they are not.

To defend

our limited view of legal reasoning and at the same explain the
apparent behavior of courts, we propose that a number of timehonored judicial techniques function not as actual decisionmaking
tools but as indirect strategies to avoid the disadvantages that
judges face in their dual capacities as adjudicators and
lawmakers.

3

Part I: Law and Its Function
Chapter One: Settlement

Moral Controversy
The need for legal reasoning comes about when members of a
community confer authority on certain individuals to settle moral
controversies.1

The controversies that concern us arise in a

community whose members agree on moral values at a fairly high
level of generality and accept these values as guides for their
own action.2

Individuals who are fundamentally like-minded and

well-intentioned may nevertheless differ about the specific
implications of moral values, or they may be uncertain about the
best ways to realize shared values.

Recognizing that

controversies of this kind are inevitable, the community can
reduce the moral costs of disagreement and uncertainty by
delegating a power of settlement to a chosen authority.
Settlement, as we use the term, is not simply choice of a
solution.

It entails reasoning, by which we mean conscious,

language-based deliberation about reasons for the choice
ultimately made.3

The members of our imagined community have not

agreed to flip a coin; they have selected a human authority to
translate the values that serve as reasons for action within the
community into solutions to practical problems.

Given the flaws

of human reasoning, the solutions the authority endorses may not
4

be justified in the sense that they are morally correct.

But,

because the authority’s task is to settle what the community’s
values require in practice, its conclusions must be susceptible
to justificatory argument.

They cannot refer to intuition alone.

If the authority chosen to settle controversies could be on
the scene whenever a dispute or uncertainty arose, there would be
no need for anything more than a series of decisions about what
outcome is best in each instance, all things considered.
Normally, however, it is neither practical nor desirable for
authorities to be constantly on hand; therefore, the community
will need a form of settlement that can guide future
decisionmaking.

The way to accomplish this broader form of

settlement is through authoritative rules.4
A rule, for this purpose, is a general prescription that
sets out the course of action individual actors should follow in
cases that fall within the predicate terms of the rule.

To

settle potential controversies effectively, the rule must
prescribe, in understandable and relatively uncontroversial
terms, a certain response to a certain range of factual
circumstances.5

It must claim to prescribe, and be taken as

prescribing, what all actors subject to the rule should do in all
cases it covers.

It must also require its subjects to respond as

prescribed without reconsidering what action would best promote
the reasons or values that lie behind the rule.
5

We call rules of

this kind “serious rules,” as distinguished from advisory rules
or “rules of thumb” that purport to guide but not to dictate
action.6
For example, suppose that a rulemaking authority enacts the
rule “No one shall keep a bear in within 1000 feet of a private
residence.”7

The motivating reason for this rule may be to

protect the safety and peace of mind of the inhabitants of
residential neighborhoods.

At a deeper level, the rule may

reflect the assumptions that human interests rank higher than the
interests of bears and that the liberty of property owners to use
their property as they wish is subject to a duty not to inflict
harm on others.

In some situations, the rationale for the rule

may not apply with its ordinary force: the bear may be a gentle,
declawed former circus animal, kept in a sturdy double cage.

But

the rule makes no exceptions: its upshot is that bear owners must
keep their bears elsewhere, irrespective of the underlying
purpose of the rule.8

Rule subjects therefore need not consult

the rule’s purposes in order to determine the what the rule
requires of them.
We use the term rule in a fairly inclusive way.9

The rules

we are interested in are posited by human beings; in this
respect, they differ from non-posited moral principles.
rules’

The

prescriptions are serious in the manner we have just

described.

Aside from these characteristics, the rules we are
6

concerned with may be quite general or fairly specific, so long
as they are general enough to settle some range of future cases.
They may be posited in canonical form or implicit in material
such as judicial opinions, as long as they are traceable to human
decisionmaking and determinate enough to guide action without the
need for further assessment of the reasons that motivate them.10
Communities designate authorities to make rules because and
to the extent that they deem authoritative settlement to be
superior to individual decisionmaking.

The preference for

settlement derives from the moral costs of controversy and
uncertainty and from the ability of the chosen authorities to
design rules that further the community’s values and ends.

In

particular, settlement avoids strife; it solves coordination
problems that arise when one person’s reasons for action depend
on the actions of others; and it limits the need for costly
deliberation.11

If rulemaking authorities are wiser than most

members of the community, or have more deliberative resources at
their command, authoritative settlement is also more likely than
unconstrained reasoning to resolve controversy in morally
desirable ways.12
We emphasize that authoritative rules address the problems
of controversy and uncertainty, not the problem of misbehavior.
In a non-ideal community, disputes may occur because particular
individuals defect from prevailing values or refuse to accept
7

moral constraint.

We set aside disputes of this kind because we

wish to show that settlement is necessary even in the most
auspicious social circumstances.

In any event, when the problem

is defection from well-defined values rather than moral
uncertainty, rules are not necessary: the community can refer
directly to the values it accepts and, guided by those values
alone, punish or exact reparations from errant individuals.
Conversely, doubt and disagreement make rules essential even
when all members of the community agree on the values they wish
to pursue.

Everyone may agree that private property is morally

justified and socially valuable, that owners should have the
greatest possible freedom to use and enjoy their property that is
compatible with the interests of others, and that human safety is
of great importance, and yet differ about whether keeping a pet
bear interferes unreasonably with the enjoyment of surrounding
land.

This type of disagreement provides the motive and

justification for authoritative rules.13
In a well-developed legal system, rulemaking power will not
be confined to in a single official.

The community may designate

different rulemakers or rulemaking bodies for different domains,
and rulemakers themselves may establish secondary rules that vest
power in other sources.14

Delegation of rulemaking power from

one authority to another may also be implicit in institutional
arrangements.

For example, when a primary rulemaker designates
8

others to adjudicate disputes that arise under rules, the
interpreter has power, at least presumptively, to supplement the
rules when they prove to be incomplete or indeterminate.15
interpreter then becomes a rulemaker in its own right.

The

An

implicit delegation of rulemaking authority also occurs when the
primary rulemaker chooses to promulgate a standard - that is, a
vague prescription that is likely to be indeterminate in many of
its applications - rather than a determinate rule of conduct.16
The vagueness of standards typically stems from their use of
evaluative terms about which there is disagreement or uncertainty
and therefore a need for settlement.

Yet the standard itself,

because it uses these terms, fails to provide settlement.
Therefore the standard functions as a delegation by the rulemaker
to actors in the first instance, and then to adjudicators called
on to apply the standard, to act as rulemakers.
Alternatively, official rulemakers may decline to issue a
prescription in any form, leaving individual actors free to
choose their own courses of action within a certain domain.

Or,

if pluralism in interpretation of values and ends appears more
important than settlement, the community may decline to confer
rulemaking authority within a domain.

Even within an unregulated

domain, however, rules may guide action as individuals formulate
general propositions to govern their own deliberations.

In

situations of this kind, individual actors act as their own
9

rulemakers.17

The Dilemma of Rules
Serious rules are necessary for effective settlement of
moral and practical controversy.

At the same time, serious rules

generate a dilemma that renders authoritative settlement a
psychological mystery, if not an impossibility.

We have

discussed this dilemma at length elsewhere; our present purposes
require only a brief summary.18
If a rule is to settle doubt and controversy, it cannot
simply track the values it is designed to promote.

Instead, it

must simplify moral and practical problems and translate disputed
concepts into concrete terms.

As a consequence, the rule will

sometimes dictate a result that differs from what its motivating
reasons require.19

The rule “No bears within 1000 feet of a

private residence” will prevent some bear lovers from rescuing
circus animals, or result in their punishment, when the bear in
question is unlikely to cause harm.
Nevertheless, from the point of view of the rulemaking
authority, as well as the community it governs, the best form of
settlement may be a per se rule: no bears.
unconstrained decisionmakers make mistakes.

The reason is that
Bear owners may make

more errors, or errors of greater magnitude, in assessing
potential harm case by case than they would make by following the
10

rule consistently.

If so, then it is rational and morally

correct for the authority to issue a serous rule and insist on
full compliance.
The dilemma of serious rules arises when one shifts to the
perspective of individuals who are governed by the rules, the
rule subjects.

Setting aside for the moment the possibility of

sanctions for disobeying the rule, if a bear owner believes that
his bear is unlikely to cause harm and needs a home, he may
believe that following the rule is not the morally correct course
of action, and it will not be rational for him to follow it.20
Yet, if we return to the perspective of the authority, the
matter looks different because the bear owner may be wrong.

By

hypothesis, the moral and practical costs of potential mistakes
are higher than the costs of full compliance with the rule; this
is why the authority issued the rule.

Therefore, it continues to

be rational and morally correct for the authority to insist on
compliance by all owners of bears.

There is, in other words, a

gap between the rational and morally correct course of action for
the rulemaking authority (issue and enforce the rule) and the
rational and morally correct response on the part of the rule
subject (disobey).21
We do not believe this gap can be closed, at least as long
as rule subjects act rationally.

Rule subjects might adopt the

attitude Frederick Schauer calls rule-sensitive particularism,
11

taking into account the impact that failure to comply would have
on the settlement value of the rule (the value of peace,
coordination, expertise, and decisionmaking efficiency).22

Rule-

sensitive particularism is rational, and probably required as a
matter of correct reason.

But it will not close the gap between

the authority and rule subjects as long as some rule subjects may
conclude that the reasons for violating rules outweigh all the
reasons that motivate the rule, including the value of
settlement.

Indeed, rule-sensitive particularism is always

threatened with unraveling and becoming nothing more than caseby-case all-things-considered particularism.

For in a community

of rule sensitive particularists, everyone would realize that no
one was treating rules as serious rules.

Therefore, the

settlement value of rules would be reduced, which in turn would
mean less expected compliance with rules and therefore less
settlement value, and so on until the rules collapsed completely
as serious rules.
Alternatively, rule subjects might resolve to follow rules
unless the action prescribed by a rule is obviously wrong in a
particular case - an attitude Schauer describes as presumptive
positivism.23

This attitude, however, is not fully rational: the

rule subject must resist acting on his or her best judgment
unless the moral mistake in the application of the rule is not
just likely, but overwhelmingly likely.24
12

In any event, even if

we assume that a limited inquiry into reasons for action is
psychologically feasible, there remains a possibility that rule
subjects will err in applying the presumption called for by this
approach.

If so, the gap persists, particularly when the primary

value of the rule lies in coordination.25
The rulemaking authority can attempt to close the gap by
providing for sanctions against those who violate rules.

In

terms of rationality, if not morality, enforcement may close the
gap between rulemakers and actors deciding whether to obey the
rules, if violators are uniformly punished, and if avoiding
punishment counts as a reason for action.26

However, a secondary

gap arises when judges are asked to impose sanctions on subjects
who have done what the judge perceives (or what the subjects
perceive) to be right in a particular situation.

In such a case,

it is morally and rationally problematic for the judge to enforce
the rules.27

Moreover, to the extent that this secondary gap

between rulemaker and judges prevents uniform punishment, the
primary gap between rulemaker and subjects recurs.28
In fact, people do follow rules.

They comply with rules

they have designed for themselves and with rules imposed by
authorities they recognize as legitimate, without reassessing
underlying reasons for action.

We suspect that the explanation

for compliance lies in habit, socialization, and an element of
self-deception.

In our present inquiry into legal reasoning, we
13

shall assume that some such combination of psychological
mechanisms allows subjects and judges to follow and enforce rules
in most cases.

Nevertheless, the dilemma of serious rules

remains in the background as we discuss deduction of legal
conclusions from rules.

The Possibility of Determinate Rules
Another important background feature of our analysis of
legal reasoning is the assumption that rules can provide
determinate answers to legal questions in a significant number of
cases.

The purpose of rules is to settle controversy about what

shared moral values and societal ends require in particular
cases.

To perform this function effectively, the rules must be

understood by most of their subjects in a similar way.

Because

the premise that rules have determinate meaning is vital to our
understanding of legal reasoning, we must briefly address ruleskepticism.29
Critics of rule-oriented legal theory have challenged the
assumption that rules can communicate determinate instructions to
their subjects in various ways.

Some are broadly skeptical about

the capacity of law to constrain decisionmaking.30

Others

believe in the possibility of legal constraint but argue that
constraint comes not from rules but from professional norms or
specialized modes of reasoning such as reasoning by analogy.31
14

Particularly among proponents of analogical reasoning, the
claim of indeterminacy often takes the form of an assertion that
legal rules, being general, cannot determine their own
application to particular cases.32

This argument obviously runs

contrary to our own conception of rule-oriented decisionmaking,
in which the critical feature of serious rules is precisely their
capacity to dictate their application to particular cases.

It

might also seem puzzling to an ordinary rule subject, for whom
many rules appear to provide comprehensible instructions about
what to do.
What, then, does it mean to say that rules cannot determine
their own application?

One way to understand this claim of

indeterminacy is that the full extension of a rule - all cases to
which it applies - is never clear from the rule’s terms.
true as far as it goes.

This is

If a rule prohibits bear owners from

keeping their bears in “residential neighborhoods,” cases are
sure to arise involving mobile homes or hotels that may or may
not be residential and may or may not count as neighborhoods.
Ambiguity at the margins of usage, however, is not fatal to rulegoverned legal reasoning if the meaning of the rule is clear in a
significant number of cases.

Rules will sometimes leave

important controversies unsettled.

How often this will occur is

a difficult empirical question, but common experience suggests
that indeterminacy is not pervasive.33
15

Another interpretation is that the claim that rules are
indeterminate is a general claim about language.

It may be that

in a certain technical sense, the words of a rule have no
“meaning” apart from their use in particular cases because there
are no facts in the world that correspond to the meaning of
abstract language.34

This argument is linguistically interesting

but unimportant for purposes of legal reasoning.

Whatever the

true nature of linguistic meaning, basic social understandings
allow courts and rule subjects to make sense of the language of
rules.
Assume, for example, that the governing rule prohibits the
keeping of bears “within 1000 feet of a private residence without
the owner’s consent.”

This rule contains some tricky words:

ownership is a complicated legal construct, and a full definition
of consent involves contestable moral conclusions.35

Yet, the

more typical forms of ownership are widely known, and most people
understand that in a case of disputed land use, consent normally
means express permission.

Thus, in at least some instances, and

probably in many, the words of the no-bear rule, coupled with
minimal linguistic and social expertise on the part of rulesubjects, dictate the rule’s application.

As Frederick Schauer

puts it, among members of a community who share a language and a
sense of its “universal context,” words and their intended
meanings have “semantic autonomy.”36
16

(For us, if not for

Schauer, semantic autonomy does not imply the autonomy of words
from the author’s intended meanings - an autonomy we reject.37
Semantic autonomy means only the autonomy of those intended
meanings from the purposes the words and their meanings are
intended to achieve.

Autonomy in this sense is enough to make

rules determinate in core cases.)
A more significant version of the claim that legal rules
cannot determine their own application is the claim that the
meaning of any rule depends on its purpose.

On this view, rules

are promulgated as means for realizing certain underlying values
and ends, and the only way to ascertain their application to
particular cases is to ask what those values and ends require in
the circumstances.38

Assuming the no-bear rule is designed to

protect the safety of surrounding residents, a bear owner, or a
court, might conclude that it should not apply to a very docile,
well-caged bear 999 feet from a single residence occupied by a
retired lion tamer.

Thus, even in a linguistically simple case,

the words of the rule do not determine whether an entry is
legally permissible.
In our view, this argument overlooks the settlement function
of serious rules.

Given the possibility That those who apply

rules will err in assessing the implications of a rule’s purposes
for individual cases, the best way to promote those purposes may
be to identify a course of action that, if universally followed,
17

will result in fewer errors overall.

In other words, the

benefits of the rule as a means of advancing purposes to
realizing certain values come precisely from its semantic
autonomy - the independence of what it prescribes from the
purposes it serves.

At best, the argument that rules are

indeterminate because their meaning in particular cases depends
on their purposes expresses a contestable view about the best way
to pursue social ends rather than a logical implication of
rules.39
Another variant of the indeterminacy argument takes a
different form but is ultimately similar in effect.

Rule

skeptics sometimes assert that rules cannot determine the
outcomes of particular cases because the application of any rule
depends on a prior classification of facts.40

For example,

Steven Burton states that at the point of application of a rule,
“[t]he connection between the abstract class and the case remains
to be drawn... Drawing this all-important connection - placing a
case in a legal class - requires a judgement of importance to
mark the particular facts that justify the classification.”41
Burton has something more in mind than the obvious truth
that the outcome of any decision depends on the decisionmaker’s
skill and integrity in finding facts.42

Rather, his claim

appears to be that the decisionmaker must judge which facts count
as important features of the case in order to determine whether
18

the case fits within the words of the rule.
be so?

But why should this

If we are correct that the words of a rule, read in light

of common social understandings about usage and context, have
semantic autonomy, it should follow that rules themselves pick
out the important features of individual cases.

Burton may be

using the term “classification” to refer to an assessment of the
relationship between specific facts and the underlying purposes
of the rule: if, and only if, certain facts are important to the
purposes of the rule, or to the overall question of what outcome
is best, they should be classified as falling within the terms of
the rule.43

If this is the argument, however, it suffers from

the same weakness as the argument from purposive interpretation
of rules: it depends on an inadequate view of the operation of
rules.
The last indeterminacy argument we address is an argument
about the body of legal rules as a whole.

Centuries of

legislative and judicial rulemaking have produced a tangled
accumulation of rules.

Even if we assume that individual rules

have a degree of semantic autonomy, the number and complexity of
existing rules, combined with a certain amount of interpretive
play, makes it likely that in a case of any difficulty two or
more different rules will point to different outcomes.

As a

consequence, legal rules do not determine the outcome of
particular cases: decisionmakers face a choice among rules, a
19

choice for which the rules themselves provide no guidance.44
This claim of indeterminacy is significant, but we do not
think it seriously threatens the possibility of governance by
rules.

As Frederick Schauer has pointed out, the extent of

overlap among rules is an empirical question.45

Moreover, rather

than simply choosing among rules that appear to conflict, judges
can and do avoid conflict by ranking and refining the rules.

.

The very fact that legal actors try to reconcile conflicting
rules belies the suggestion that the multiplicity of rules
undermines legal constraint.46

The Nature of Law
Legal reasoning is, of course, about law.

So it might seem

that to properly address the subject of legal reasoning, we must
first specify what we mean by law.

We do not think this is the

case: nothing in our analysis of legal reasoning requires an
answer to the jurisprudential question what counts as law.
Nevertheless, it may be useful to summarize briefly how we might
respond to that question.
In classic debates about the identity of law, the principal
divide has been between natural law and positivism.47

Those who

support the natural law position hold that because law purports
to guide action and impose obligations, the validity of any
proposition as law depends on its conformity to moral standards.
20

Positivists, on the other hand, hold that the status of a norm as
law depends on social facts, and in particular on the fact that
the norm was posited by a source generally recognized as a
lawmaking authority.

Moral evaluation is not necessary - and, on

some versions of positivism, not permissible - in determining the
identity and content of law.

Another difference between natural

law and positivism is methodological: natural law theorists look
at law from the committed stance of insiders, who look to law for
their own practical guidance, whereas positivists look at law
from the external position of observers analyzing the practices
of those who are committed to law.48
In some ways, our understanding of the function and
operation of law fits more comfortably within a positivist theory
of law than a natural law theory.

Communities recognize

lawmaking authorities because they want the benefits of
settlement; effective settlement requires serious rules; and
serious rules, even the best serious rules possible, produce
morally defective outcomes in some cases.
At the same time, however, our view of law is linked to
morality in several ways.

We recognize that the positivist’s

route to settlement relies on insiders’ recognition of lawmaking
authority and insiders’ compliance with particular laws, both of
which are moral matters.

The settlement function that justifies

legal authorities and their posited norms - the very phenomena
21

that are the focus of positivism - is itself a moral function.
Its aim is to reduce the moral costs of anarchy, coasts that will
occur even among those who are morally motivated.

Moreover, as

we stated at the outset, the act of settlement entails
moralreasoning: the authority’s rules, if not actually justified,
must be the product of a conscious process that is susceptible to
justificatory argument.

Only then can members of the community

view them as an exercise of the authority they have conferred,
authority to settle what the community’s values require.
Thus, for us, positivism and natural law are complementary
rather than conflicting positions that describe two different
facets of “law.”

Indeed, a central feature of our analysis of

law is the dilemma of rules described above, a dilemma that
arises from the dual “natural law/positivist” character of law
and raises doubts about the possibility of law in the positivist
sense.
In this book, we approach the problem of legal reasoning
within a mainly positivist framework.

We focus on how judges

respond to posited law and how they distinguish between reasoning
from posited law and reasoning in the absence of posited law.
Moreover, our analysis proceeds from a detached perspective of
the kind associated with positivism.
Ultimately, we argue that courts function in two ways: they
reason deductively from rules posited by others, or they posit
22

law, relying on moral and empirical judgement as any lawmaker
must.

For us, there is no middle ground in which courts discover

non-posited law in past decisions or texts, or combine morality
and posited law to construct legal principles.

At the same time,

however, we are sensitive to both the moral ends of law
(settlement and its benefits) and the dilemma that judges and
rule-subjects face when posited law appears to dictate morally
erroneous results.

23
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Part II: Common Law Reasoning: Deciding Cases When Prior Judicial
Decisions Determine the Law
We have assumed that even in an ideal community whose
members share basic values and are disposed to act on them,
settling controversies over specific applications of those values
will be a high priority.

Accordingly, the community will vest a

power of settlement in chosen authorities.

The community’s

primary lawmaking authorities, being unable to preside over every
dispute that arises, will design and enforce general, serious
rules.
In many cases, the primary authority’s rules will prove
sufficiently determinate to settle controversy without further
official involvement.

But this will not always be the case.

Rules will require interpretation, a problem we take up in later
chapters.

Rules also will require enforcement: even if all

actors within the community are disposed to act on the same
values that animate the authorities’ rules, some may be mistaken
about what the rules require and others may believe that, in a
given case, what the rule prescribes is wrong.

Finally, the set

of rules promulgated by lawmaking authorities will not provide
answers to all questions that might arise in disputes.

For all

these reasons, the community, or the primary rulemaking
authority, will need to create adjudicative authorities - judges
with power to apply rules and settle particular disputes.
1

It is possible to conceive of a legal system in which judges
performed a purely adjudicative function.

Judicial decisions

would not be publicized and, consequently, would have no
prospective effect.1

Actual legal systems, however, have not

evolved this way, perhaps as a result of community demand for
settlement.2
In the early period of English common law, for example, the
role of courts was confined almost entirely to retrospective
adjudication.3

Judges announced their views orally, and the only

written records of decisions were uninformative formal entries
and scanty collections of observers’ notes.4

Precedents were

invoked from memory and were cited, if at all, as evidence of law
rather than embodiments of law.5

The common law itself was

conceived of as an amalgam of custom and reason taken up by
judges.6

Over time, however, judicial decisions became

increasingly public, textualized, and authoritative, particularly
in the United States.7

Reports were regularized, secondary

materials sorted precedents by legal type, and judges began to
write opinions.8

Lawyers focused increasingly on the texts

representing judicial opinions, and judges as well as legal
observers came to recognize a stronger connection between past
and future decisions.9
This suggests that adjudication is unlikely to remain purely
that in a working legal system.

At the least, decisions in the
2

adjudication of controversies, as well as the reasoning on which
they are based, will be known to the public.

Once publicized,

adjudicative decisions and their bases will serve not only as
examples of legal reasoning but as subjects of legal reasoning by
courts and private actors.10

The following chapters address the

nature of this reasoning.

Chapter Two: Ordinary Reason Applied to Law: Natural Reasoning
and Deduction From Rules
In our view, there are two plausible models of common law
reasoning, and only two.11

One is the “natural” model, in which

courts resolve disputes by deciding what outcome is best, all
things considered.

In the courts’ balance of reasons for

decision, prior judicial decisions are entitled to exactly the
weight they naturally command.12
The second model of common law reasoning is the “rule”
model, in which courts treat rules announced by prior courts as
serious rules of decision, then revert to natural decisonmaking
when rules provide no answers.13

The difference between these

two is that the natural model of common law reasoning treats
judicial decisions as facts about the world; the rule model
treats them as sources of law.

In the next chapter, we shall

explain why, contrary to many popular views of common-law
decisionmaking, we believe that there are no other intelligible
ways to reason from precedent.
3

The Natural Model of Common-Law Reasoning
The most obvious tools for courts to use in addressing
controversies are moral and empirical reasoning.

Moral reasoning

typically follows the method of reflective equilibrium: the
reasoner makes an initial judgment about how a particular case
should be resolved, formulates a tentative moral principle to
support her initial judgment, then tests the principle by
picturing other actual and hypothetical examples of its
application.

If the principle yields results the reasoner judges

to be wrong in test cases, the reasoner must then refine her
analysis.

She can either reject the supporting principle and

reconsider her initial judgment, hold to her initial judgment and
attempt to reformulate the principle, or, if she is convinced
that the principle as she formulated it is sound, reconsider her
judgments about its other applications.

By moving between

principles and particulars in this way, the reasoner can reach a
better understanding of both moral values and their implications
for the case at hand.14
For example: Heidi is a judge.

In the case before her,

Stephen has made plans to open a halfway house for released
prisoners in a residential neighborhood.15

Brian, who owns a

home next to the proposed site for the halfway house, has sued to
enjoin the project as a nuisance.

He argues that a halfway house

will increase traffic and bring to the neighborhood unsavory
4

characters who might have a bad influence on local children.
Stephen’s evidence shows that the halfway house will house only
non-violent criminals such as minor drug offenders and that
prisoners are more likely to make a successful transition back
into society if they spend time in a halfway house.

Stephen has

not yet invested significant resources in the project.

We

assume, as we shall assume throughout this chapter, that there
are no pertinent public regulations or private land use
agreements in the legal background of the case.
Heidi’s initial sense of the case is that the halfway house
should be allowed to open.

The burden on landowners like Brian

is not too great, and Stephen will have difficulty finding a
suitable location if residential landowners are given a veto.

To

support this judgment, she formulates a principle: uses of land
that do not pose a significant threat to the health or safety of
surrounding owners should be permitted.
To test her principle, Heidi considers examples of some
other activities that might be challenged as nuisances if carried
on in a residential neighborhood, examples drawn from actual
cases or from her imagination.

In her view: keeping a bear

should not be allowed; a rifle range should not be allowed; a
paintball arena should not be allowed; a mortuary should not be
allowed (ick); a day care center is reasonable; and a sewage
treatment plant is reasonable.

Heidi’s principle, allowing land
5

uses that pose no significant threat to health or safety,
confirms her judgment about the bear (risky), the rifle range
(risky), the day care center (low risk), and probably the sewage
treatment plant (not much risk).
paintball and mortuaries.

However, it does not exclude

At this point, Heidi might reformulate

the principle: uses of land that pose no significant threat to
health or safety and provide a needed service to the community
should be permitted.

The added requirement of public interest

leaves open the possibility that homeowners could resist a
paintball arena and is therefore more consistent with Heidi’s
judgments about particular cases.
problem.

The mortuary remains a

Disposing of bodies might be deemed a needed service;

if so, Heidi may need to reconsider her initial response to that
case.
In any event, the issues posed by the halfway house dispute
seem clearer now than when Heidi began.

The method of reasoning

she has used, however, is not uniquely legal.

It is what any

careful reasoner does in working through a moral problem.
Some controversies requiring settlement by courts will turn
on the probable consequences of actions or the best means for
implementing agreed ends, rather than on specification of moral
principles.

In such a case, courts must engage in empirical

reasoning, gathering data and testing hypotheses.

Empirical

reasoning is probably more prominent when courts consciously
6

formulate general rules for future cases than when they focus on
the resolution of a single dispute, but it can enter into
particularized decisionmaking as well, for example, when the
outcome fo a dispute depends on an assessment of risk.

The case

of the halfway house illustrates the point: to decide the
question of nuisance, Heidi must determine whether non-violent
ex-prisoners pose a substantial threat to the safety of
neighbors.16
law.

Again, this type of assessment is not unique to

There are legal procedures that may assist Heidi in

assessing the risk of violence, and some that may limit her
ability to do so, but there is nothing especially “legal” about
the method of reasoning involved.
Within a natural model of common-law decisionmaking, moral
and empirical reasoning are the only tools courts use to resolve
disputes.

This does not mean, however, that courts disregard

past judicial decisions; past decisions enter into moral and
empirical reasoning as facts about the world that can affect the
outcome of a current case.

Yet past decisions are not

authoritative in the sense that they might dictate an outcome
that is contrary to the court’s best judgment of what should be
done, all things considered.
The principal way in which prior decisions affect current
decisionmaking within a natural model of precedent is as a source
of expectations.17

Expectations can form around judicial
7

decisions in several ways.

First, parties to a dispute may rely

on the finality of the court’s disposition.

For example: Claire

plans to open a day care facility in Jules’s neighborhood.

Jules

seeks an injunction on the ground that careless parents are
likely to damage surrounding lawns as they drop off their
children.

Heidi concludes that the proposed facility is not a

nuisance and denies the injunction.

Claire and Jules will expect

Heidi to reach the same result if Jules sues again, unless the
facts have changed in some important way.

As a consequence,

Claire may go forward with her day care investment and Jules may
pave over a section of grass.
Apart from the immediate parties, others may observe the
outcome of a litigated dispute and form an expectation that
courts will reach similar conclusions in the future.

Leo, who is

thinking of opening a day care facility in a neighborhood similar
to Jules’s, may calculate that future courts will not view day
care as a nuisance.

Accordingly, he is now more likely to go

forward with his plans.
Without more, a third party expectation such as Leo’s is not
necessarily a justified expectation and therefore not a reason
for decision within a natural model of the common law.

Apart

from the merits of the decision, which Leo is in no better
position to predict now than he was before Heidi decided the case
of Jules v. Claire, the reasonableness of Leo’s prediction of
8

consistent treatment depends on the likelihood that courts will
in fact take his expectations into account as a reason for
decision.

In other words, his expectations are not justified

unless there is some independent reason, other than his having
formed them, for courts to protect them.
There is, however, a general social interest in facilitating
private expectations.18

Another way to put this is that there is

a social interest in coordination.

Lack of coordination among

individual actors is a common source of moral and practical
error: the best course of action for one person often depends on
the actions others take.

Yet the actions of others are difficult

to predict, especially when their choices too depend on others’
unforeseeable acts.19
In a legal system in which judicial decisions are publicly
accessible, courts can provide coordination by acting
consistently over time.

Individual actors can then predict with

some degree of confidence that others will conform their conduct
to the express or implied requirements of past decisions.
Suppose that Sai is about to make a career decision that turns in
part on the availability of local day care in Leo’s suburb.

If

Heidi refuses to enjoin Claire’s facility in the case of Jules v.
Claire, and Sai knows that later courts are likely to give weight
to expectations of judicial consistency because of their social
importance, Sai has an additional reason to anticipate that he
9

will have easy access to day care and can make a better informed
decision about his career.

Moreover, because the value of

coordination provides courts with an independent reason for
consistency with past decisions, apart from avoiding harm to the
specific individuals who formed expectations based on those
decisions, Leo’s and Sai’s expectations about the course of
future adjudication are now justified expectations.

As such,

they become moral reasons for judicial consistency in their own
right.
Another reason sometimes given for consistency with past
decisions under a natural model of common-law decisionmaking is
equal treatment: as a moral matter, similarly situated parties
should be treated alike; therefore, when two like cases arise
over time, the later court should conform its decision to the
decision of the earlier court.

Suppose, for example, that Jules

v. Claire, the day care case, is now pending before Heidi.

Jules

cites a prior case in which another judge, Rick, granted an
injunction prohibiting Ben from opening a day care facility in a
residential neighborhood.

Many would say that Rick’s prior

decision gives Heidi a reason, if not a conclusive reason, to
enjoin Claire: Ben and Claire should be treated alike.20
Equal treatment, on this view, is a moral value in its own
right, independent from other moral principles.

If protection of

residents from traffic and noise were definitive moral reasons to
10

enjoin Ben, and Claire’s facility will cause traffic and noise to
the same or a greater extent, then Claire should be enjoined as
well.

The reason for doing so, however, is not equality but

traffic and noise.

Equal treatment enters in when other moral

principles do not require Heidi to reach the same result in
Claire’s case that Rick reached in Ben’s case.

Equal treatment

is also distinct from the parties’ expectation: the argument from
equal treatment applies even when there is no suggestion that
Jules has changed his position in reliance on the outcome in
Ben’s case.
A related point is that equal treatment matters only when
the prior decision appears to have been wrong.

If Heidi believes

that Rick was correct in his judgment that the noise and traffic
generated by Ben’s day care facility amounted to a nuisance, and
if she also believes that Claire’s case and Ben’s case are alike,
equal treatment need not enter into her reasoning because
protection of residents against noise and traffic provide the
grounds for a like result.

Only if Heidi believes that Rick was

correct about Ben, and that Claire should win against Jules, does
equal treatment become a consideration.
Although the principle “treat like cases alike” is widely
accepted as a cornerstone of fairness, we believe it has no place
in common-law reasoning about the implications of past
decisions.21

One reason is that real cases are never truly
11

alike: Claire’s day care facility is sure to differ in some ways
from Ben’s.

Moreover, the only access Heidi has to the facts of

Ben’s case is the recital of facts in Rick’s opinion.

Rick’s

opinion, written with other purposes in mind, may filter out
facts that differentiate the cases in important ways.
More important, even if we assume that the past and present
parties are similarly situated in all relevant ways, we fail to
see how equal treatment of this type can count as a moral good.
For purposes of Heidi’s reasoning, the current case can only be
viewed from Heidi’s perspective, and Heidi believes that Rick’s
prior decision enjoining a day care center was a moral error.
One moral error is not a reason for another.

Ben may have

suffered an unjust loss in his case, but his loss is a
consequence of the prior error, not of Heidi’s decision for
Claire, and a contrary decision - to enjoin Claire - will not
make good the loss.
Let us elaborate on this point, for the argument that equal
treatment is a moral imperative can be seductive.

Equal

treatment of a certain type is a moral imperative in particular
situations.

For example, when what justice requires is solely

comparative, as some claim it to be in matters of retribution,
and still more claim it to be in matters of distribution of
resources or opportunities, then if A receives a certain
punishment or a certain distribution of benefits, and B is
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identical to A in terms of retributive or distributive desert,
then it follows that B should receive what A received in equal
measure.

The general point is banal: under any moral principle

that dictates that A and B should be treated the same, if A is
given treatment T, morality demands that B be given treatment T.
In the cases we are considering, however, the present judge
believes that in the prior case, the losing party was treated in
a way that was morally wrong.

The question before us is whether

any moral notion of equality demands that if one party is treated
wrongly, it is right to treat another party in the same way - a
way that would be wrong in the absence of the prior case.

Does

killing half of an ethnic group as an act of genocide create any
reason based on equality, however weak, to complete the task?

We

think the answer is obviously “no”: equality furnishes absolutely
no reason to extend past immoralities.
The same is true of judicial decisions: reliance aside, the
fact that judges have strayed from the standard of morally
correct treatment in the past does not alter the obligation of
present judges to apply the correct moral principle to any and
all litigants.

If, to the contrary, equal treatment were a moral

imperative requiring consistency with past decisions (including
mistaken ones), morally incorrect decisions would corrupt
morality itself.

Moreover, if the set of past cases included

both morally correct and morally incorrect decisions, the very
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notion of equality would lose coherence, with correct and
incorrect decisions pulling in different directions.
There are cases in which equal treatment may be a legitimate
consideration for judges.

If the current decision is likely to

place a prior litigant at a competitive disadvantage, avoiding
further harm may be a reason for like treatment.

If, for

example, Ben’s business will suffer if Claire is allowed to
locate in a residential neighborhood, the potential new harm to
Ben may be a (nonconclusive) reason to enjoin Claire.

But it is

Ben’s further harm, not the value of equality, that is doing the
work here.

Equal treatment may also be warranted, on grounds of

distributive justice, when the moral merits of a case are in
balance.22

If Ben’s case was essentially a coin flip on the

merits, and the same is true of Claire’s case, perhaps Ben and
Claire, who run comparable businesses, should be treated alike.
Courts, however, do not flip coins: they generally feel obliged
to reach a conclusion as to which party has the superior right.23
Once a court has determined that one party has a stronger claim,
that party should prevail without regard to past mistakes.
In sum: within a natural model of common-law decisionmaking,
courts engage in moral and empirical reasoning to determine what
outcome is best, all things considered.

Past decisions are

relevant to the extent that they have generated justified
expectations of consistency in the future.
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For those who reject

our views about equal treatment, past decisions are also relevant
to the extent of the weight properly accorded to equality (a
mystery we leave to believers).

Past decisions are not, however,

authoritative: the overall balance of reasons for a decision,
including expectations and (if you will) equal treatment,
determines the outcome of judicial reasoning.

The Rule Model of Common-Law Reasoning
An alternative model of common-law decisionmaking builds on
the natural model but adds one important feature: courts treat
rules announced by prior courts as authoritative in later cases
that fall within the rules’ terms.

When no rule applies, courts

continue to engage in moral and empirical reasoning to resolve
disputes.

If, however, the case is governed by a precedent rule,

courts turn instead to interpretation and deductive reasoning.24
To make clear the full implications of the rule model of the
common law, we must first return briefly to the natural model.
Rules have a role in the process of natural reasoning.

As we

explained in Chapter One, rules capture the rulemaker’s
expertise, provide coordination for individual actors who need to
predict what others will do, and simplify the process of
decisionmaking.

For a natural reasoner, preservation of these

rule-based benefits may be a reason to conform to the rule: if
disregarding the rule would result in a loss of rule-based
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benefits, and that loss is likely to outweigh the moral costs of
following the rule, then it is right, all things considered, to
follow the rule.
For example: Heidi is presiding over a suit to enjoin Mike’s
Mortuary from opening for business in a residential neighborhood.
Heidi discovers a prior opinion by her fellow judge, Rick,
stating that mortuaries in residential neighborhoods are
nuisances per se.25

If Heidi endorses the natural model of

decisionmaking, she will not accept the no-mortuary rule as
authoritative: the result she reaches will be based on the
balance of moral reasons for decision.

Nevertheless, the rule

may rule may affect her judgment insofar as it serves a source of
coordination or may have engendered reliance.
Within a natural model of reasoning, however, a rule
announced in a past case has only the weight it commands in allthings-considered moral reasoning.

In other words, judges

approach previously announced judicial rules as rule-sensitive
particularists,26 taking into account the value of maintaining
the rule as one of many reasons for decision.

As we said in

Chapter One, however, rule-sensitive particularism is always
threatened with collapse into pure case-by-case particularism: if
all judges are rule-sensitive particularists and all judges know
this, then the value they accord to rules as rules in their
reasoning will approach zero and they will end up reasoning like
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pure particularists.

Thus, if Heidi concludes through the

process of reflective equilibrium that no plausible moral
principle supports the exclusion of mortuaries from residential
neighborhoods, and if she is not convinced that a no-mortuary
rule has significant coordination benefits, she will ignore the
rule and hold for Mike’s.
The rule model of precedent entails a different attitude
towards rules.

In this model, prior judicial rules operate as

serious rules, preempting the question whether the reasons for
the rule justify the outcome it prescribes in a particular
case.27

If Heidi, presiding over the suit against Mike’s

Mortuary, discovers a no-mortuary rule in a prior opinion, her
inquiry into the risks, aesthetics, and social benefits of
mortuaries is finished.

Subject to certain qualifications

discussed below, she must grant an injunction.28
The rule model of common-law decisionmaking also entails a
different role for judges.

Under a rule model, rules announced

in judicial opinions acquire authoritative status.

Accordingly,

judges now function as lawmakers as well as adjudicators.
Traditionally, common-law judges were reluctant to assume
lawmaking authority: their task, as they saw it, was not to make
law but to find it embedded in social and legal practice and the
dictates of reason.29

Modern judges, however, are more

forthright in their exercise of lawmaking power.30
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The rule

model assumes that judges have such a power.

Comparing the Models
In a world in which all judges were perfect reasoners, the
natural model of the common law would undoubtably be superior to
the rule model.
every case.

The natural model seeks the best outcome in

The rule model, in contrast, guarantees that some

outcomes will be wrong.
The errors of the rule model of common law have several
sources.

First, the rule model incorporates the basic problem of

rules: rules must be stated in terms that are general and
determinate enough to guide future conduct and decisions;
therefore they do not perfectly capture the less determinate
values they are designed to promote.

It follows that in some of

the cases they cover, they will prescribe the wrong result.31
A second source of error is bad rules.

Rules prevent error

by translating the expertise of the rulemaker into prescriptions
for action, by facilitating coordination, and by reducing the
costs of decisionmaking; but they also cause error by prescribing
wrong outcomes, through bluntness or otherwise.32

They are

justified only when, judged by the values on which they are
based, they will prevent more error than they cause.33

Some

rules fail to meet this standard, either because they were poorly
conceived from the outset or because circumstances have changed
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since they were issued.
For several reasons, judicial rules are particularly likely
to lack justification or to lose their justification over time.
Judges are not necessarily expert rulemakers, and, as we shall
explain more fully in later sections, the task of resolving a
particular dispute may further hinder their ability to craft
sound rules.34

Another problem is that once judicial rules are

recognized as authoritative, they are hard to eliminate.

Judges

traditionally have been reluctant to overrule established rules
of law, and in any event it is difficult to formulate a standard
for overruling that does not jeopardize the benefits of
authoritative rules.35
Despite the inescapable flaws of serious judicial rules, the
rule model of common-law decisionmaking has advantages that we
believe justify courts in adopting it.

In the world as it

exists, judges are not perfect reasoners: judges operating under
the natural model of decisionmaking will seek to reach the best
decision, all things considered, but they will not always
succeed.

The important comparison, in other words, is not

between full implementation of values and flawed implementation
of values, but between the flaws of unconstrained reasoning and
the flaws of rules.

The rule model is preferable if there is

reason to think that a greater sum of moral errors will occur if
judges always decide what is best all-things-considered than if
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they treat previously announced judicial rules as serious rules
of decision.
As we have said, the capacity of rules to prevent error
depends primarily on the expertise of rulemakers and the
coordination value of the rules.

In the context of the common

law, the maker of rules are judges in past cases.

Comparing past

judges to present judges, rulemaker expertise does not go far to
make the case for a rule model of the common law.

In the case of

Mike’s Mortuary, for example, we can assume that Rick, who
announced the rule that mortuaries in residential neighborhoods
are nuisances per se, has no greater capacity for moral and
empirical reasoning about property rights than Heidi, the current
judge.

Moreover, the salient image in Rick’s mind at the time of

his decision probably was the mortuary at issue in his case,
which may not have been representative of mortuaries generally.36
Therefore, rather than representing special expertise, the nomortuary rule may be myopic.
Some judicial rules stand on better epistemic ground than
others.

If the mortuary rule has been followed over time by a

multitude of judges, it may be entitled to greater respect as a
reflection of collective judgment.37

A further consideration is

that judicial rules have a wider audience than future judges.
comparison to private judgment, a judicial rule may sometimes
have the advantage.

In the mortuary case, Rick has studied
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In

evidence and heard opposing arguments by advocates about the
risks, burdens, and benefits associated with mortuaries in
residential neighborhoods.

Private decisionmakers, in contrast,

may have less information at their command, and their judgment
may be distorted by self-interest.

On the other hand, in some

settings private actors will have the best information about
their own activities, so the argument from expertise remains
weak.38
A much stronger argument is that judicial rules, when
treated as serious rules, provide a new source of coordination.
The coordination effect may be easier to see if we alter the
mortuary example in the following way: in the precedent case,
Rick announces a rule that mortuaries are permissible in
residential neighborhoods as long as they pass municipal safety
inspections.

If this rule is authoritative for future judges,

mortuary entrepreneurs can make plans to locate in suburbs
without the worry that surrounding landowners will sue to prevent
them from opening.

If Heidi is free to decide in the next case

what outcome is best, all things considered, these entrepreneurs
are less able to predict how landowners will respond.

Because

lack of coordination results in decisional error, the community
has reason to favor judicial creation of authoritative legal
rules.

Serious judicial rules also can simplify decisionmaking,

both by future judges and by potential disputants, who must guess
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the course of judicial decisionmaking and settle or litigate
accordingly.39
Thus, the rule model of common law offers at least some of
the benefits of rules generally.

It creates a new set of

rulemaking authorities (judges) who, while they may lack special
expertise, can increase the level of coordination within the
community.
build.

Mortuary owners will know where they can and cannot

Homeowners will know whether mortuaries can build near

their homes.

Judges need not revisit the morality of mortuary

nuisance.
We have noted that the natural model of common law
decisionmaking also takes account of judicial rules.

Within the

natural model, judges can, and, as a matter of sound moral
reasoning, must, take account of the value of consistently
applied rules as a reason to follow rules announced in prior
cases.

But because natural reasoners approach rules as rule-

sensitive particularists, most if not all of the benefits of
rules will be lost under the natural model of decisionmaking.
To see why, suppose first that the no-mortuary rule appears
to reflect collective wisdom (a form of expertise).

Many judges

have held over time that mortuaries in residential neighborhoods
are nuisances per se.

Heidi endorses the natural model of

decisionmaking and acts as a rule-sensitive particularist.

She

recognizes that the rule bears indicia of expertise, but she also

22

understands general rules are by nature overinclusive, and she
believes that Mike’s Mortuary is a particularly well-run and
tasteful establishment.

She may reason that even if past judges

were well-informed about mortuaries generally, the balance of
reasons underlying the rule does not apply to Mike’s.
Accordingly, she may refuse to issue an injunction.

This is all

very well if Heidi is correct, but she may be wrong.

And if

judges in Heidi’s situation (or private parties predicting what
judges will do in Heidi’s situation) are wrong more often than
they are correct in second-guessing the rule, the community would
be better off if all judges treated the rule as a serious rule.
More important for our purposes, rule-sensitive
particularism runs into serious difficulties in accounting for
the coordination benefits of rules.

Suppose again that Heidi

follows the natural model of decisionmaking.

She understands

that Rick’s no-mortuary rule has the capacity to coordinate the
conduct of landowners and prospective morticians.

She also

believes that the rule should not apply to Mike’s Mortuary
because Mikes is tasteful and well-run.

The question she must

ask in the course of all-things-considered reasoning is whether a
decision for Mike’s, contrary to the rule, will cause a reduction
in the overall coordination benefits of the rule such that the
loss of coordination outweighs the moral gain from (what she
believes is) a correct understanding of liberty and property
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rights as applied to Mike’s.
One difficulty is that the loss of coordination from any
single departure from the rule may seem negligible.
problem is more serious.

But the

The coordination benefits of a judicial

rule depend on its consistent application in the courts: only
then can actors assume that future judges (and other actors) will
follow the rule.

In a legal system dominated by the natural

model of judicial reasoning, Heidi will expect most other judges
to approach judicial rules as rule-sensitive particularists.
Rather than simply following the no-mortuary rule, they will ask
whether all relevant considerations, including maintenance of the
coordination benefits of the rule, recommend enjoining a
particular mortuary from opening in a particular neighborhood.
Some will conclude that they should not grant an injunction; and,
given the inevitability of reasoning errors, some who reach this
conclusion will be wrong.

The prospect that other rule-sensitive

particularists will not follow the rule reduces the rule’s
capacity to coordinate conduct, and therefore reduces the weight
that Heidi, as well as other rule-sensitive particularist judges,
will allocate to the coordination value of the rule in their
calculations of what decision is best.

In other words, if judges

cannot predict confidently that the rule will be widely followed,
no judge will calculate that his or her departure from the rule
will damage an otherwise effective source of coordination.
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In

this way, rule-sensitive particularism as a universal practice
unravels into pure particularism stripped of serious rules and
their benefits.40
The situation changes if some judges treat precedent rules
as serious rules.

If some judges give preemptive effect to

rules, but would cease to do so if they observed rule-sensitive
particularist judges disregarding the rule, then the potential
coordination value of the rule gives rule-sensitive
particularists a reason to follow the rule.

But even when

judicial response is divided - some following the rule model and
some acting as natural reasoners - the coordination value of
rules is unstable at best.

Only a widely accepted rule model of

common-law decisionmaking preserves the full potential of
precedent rules to provide coordination.
A further problem is that, to the extent that precedent
rules retain some capacity to coordinate conduct, judges acting
as natural reasoners may fail to give coordination its due weight
in the balance of reasons for decision.

The difficulty is

cognitive: psychological research suggests that decisionmakers
tend to focus on facts that are especially salient, and in doing
so, tend to disregard or undervalue background probabilities.
This bias, which Kahneman and Tversky have called the
“availability heuristic,” is one of a number of cognitive biases
that facilitate decisionmaking but also distort human reasoning
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in systematic ways.41

Tangible facts move quickly to the front

of one’s mind, while statistical regularities remain obscure; as
a result, the more readily available features of a problem claim
disproportionate attention.
In legal disputes, the most salient facts are likely to be
the circumstances of the litigants before the court.

In the

mortuary case, Heidi’s attention will naturally be drawn to the
character of the plaintiffs’ neighborhood, the emotional impact a
mortuary is likely to have on the plaintiffs,42 and the specifics
of Mike’s proposed mortuary.

Meanwhile, the availability

heuristic predicts that Heidi’s interest will not be similarly
engaged by the possibility that departing from the rule might
undermine potential coordination benefits for mortuaries and
homeowners making plans in other neighborhoods.
Thus, even if the actual coordination value of a rule is not
entirely eroded by the prospect that some judges will not follow
the rule, judges may systematically underemphasize coordination
value in their calculation of what is best all-things-considered.
The rule model of judicial decisionmaking prevents this form of
error by preempting all-things-considered analysis.

I this way,

it both preserves the actual coordination value of the rule and
builds in protection against judicial miscalculation of that
value.
A further point of comparison between the rule model of
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judicial decisionmaking and the natural model is the complexity
of the decisionmaking process.

The rule model requires

interpretation of rules, but once the court has determined that a
precedent rule covers the case before it, all that remains is to
follow the prescription of the rule.

Under the natural model, in

contrast, the existence of a precedent rule complicates rather
than simplifies decisionmaking.

A rule-sensitive particularist

judge must make at least a quick assessment of the rule’s meaning
to determine whether it is likely to apply, and then must
determine what weight the possible benefits of maintaining the
rule should have in the balance of reasons for decision.
A definitive comparison of the two models of judicial
decisionmaking we have discussed - the rule model and the natural
model - would require empirical knowledge that we do not have.
The critical question is whether the rule model ultimately
results in less decisional error than the natural model.

The

answer depends on, among other things, the number and magnitude
of likely reasoning errors by judges, the social value of various
benefits of rules that might be lost under a natural model of
reasoning, and the number and magnitude of errors that result
from compliance with a contingent set of overinclusive rules matters that are extremely difficult to quantify or compare.
are inclined to think that, given the frequency of human error

We

and the demand for settlement we observe in society, the rule
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model is the better choice.

In any event, it is at least

possible, as a matter of logic, that deduction from imperfect
serious rules will produce better results overall than allthings-considered evaluation of what decision is best.
Although there are reasons to think that judges can do
better by following precedent rules than by natural reasoning,
there are difficulties with the rule model of decisionmaking.
Most prominently, the rule model confers a broad rulemaking
authority on judges; but judges.

We have already noted that,

because judges’ first task is to resolve particular disputes,
they are not ideally positioned to design sound rules.

Later in

this chapter, we discuss possible qualifications to the rule
model that impose some restraint on judicial lawmaking and also
provide judges with a means of escape from precedent rules that
are seriously flawed.
Another set of difficulties is descriptive: judges purport
to, and are widely believed to, act in ways that are not
consistent with the rule model of decisionmaking.

As rulemakers,

they decline to exercise the full range of legislative power the
rule model makes available to them.

As rule appliers they

“distinguish” seemingly applicable rules based on factual
differences among cases.

In Chapter Four, we shall return to the

rule model and consider whether these features of judicial
practice can be explained as strategies to counteract the
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disadvantages of rulemaking in the context of adjudication.
This brings us back to the point with which we began the
present chapter: despite appearances to the contrary, we believe
that the two models of decisionmaking we have described - the
natural model and the rule model - are the only plausible models
judicial reasoning.

Moreover, neither of these models entails

special “legal” forms of reasoning.

Both rely on methods of

reasoning used by all decisionmakers:

moral reasoning,

empirical reasoning, and, in the case of the rule model,
deduction from authoritative rules.

In our view, these are all

the tools that judges need, and all the tools they use in fact.

A Closer Look at The Rule Model: Implications and Puzzles
We have suggested that, at least under some conditions,
judges can best implement the shared values of a community by
treating rules announced by past judges as serious rules that
determine the results of present cases.

A central premise of the

rule model of judicial decisionmaking is that judges act as
rulemakers: judges have authority not only to resolve disputes
but also to issue binding general rules to govern future
disputes.

The assumption that judges have power to establish

legal rules leads to a number of further questions about the
scope of judicial rulemaking authority and the nature of judicial
rules.

We do not claim to have a complete set of answers; our
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objective in the following sections is simply to identify some of
the puzzles judges might face in implementing a rule model of the
common law.
Promulgation of Rules.

The first question that arises under

a rule model of the common law is, when should judges announce
rules?

Legislatures issue rules in response to social problems

that come to their attention in a variety of ways.

Their rules

typically are prospective and designed to deal as comprehensively
as possible with the problems they have taken up.43

Judges

traditionally have taken a different approach, issuing rules in
response to particular disputes brought before them by litigants.
Judicial rules typically provide an answer to the dispute before
the court and do not stray far beyond what is necessary to
resolve that dispute.44
Nothing in the rule model of judicial decisionmaking
dictates that courts must adhere to this pattern of narrowly
conceived, retrospective rules.
rules as serious rules.

The rule model treats precedent

Yet, because rules are general in

nature, precedent rules will always extend beyond the exigencies
of the cases in which they are announced.45

It follows that the

rule model confers plenary legislative power on judges.46

There

may be constitutional limits on judicial lawmaking, as well as
pragmatic reasons for judges to abstain from exercising plenary
power,47 but there are no inherent constraints on judicial
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authority to make rules.
Suppose, for example, that Heidi is deciding the case of
Edward, who is keeping a pet bear in his home.

Neighboring

homeowners claim the bear is a nuisance and have requested an
injunction requiring Edward to remove it from the neighborhood.
After moral reflection, Heidi reaches three conclusions.

First,

bears typically should not be permitted in residential
neighborhoods.

Second, the possibility of reasoning errors and

the need for clarity, coordination, and decisionmaking simplicity
justify a serious rule: “bears in residential neighborhoods are
nuisances per se.”

Third, Edward’s bear, which is small,

friendly, and declawed and has spent its life in captivity, poses
no significant threat to neighbors; therefore Edward should be
allowed to keep his pet.
In the circumstances, Heidi has at least three options.
can decide for Edward and decline to announce a rule.

She

She can

announce the optimal rule (“bears are nuisances per se”) and
apply it retrospectively to Edward.

Or she can decide for Edward

and announce the rule “bears are nuisances per se” as a rule to
govern future cases.
The rational choice, and, if Heidi’s reasoning is morally
sound, the morally optimal choice, is the third of these: decide
for Edward and announce a prospective rule.

In this way, Heidi

can secure both a correct outcome for Edward and maximum
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settlement value for the future.

If we assume, as the rule model

assumes, that judges have authority to settle moral controversy
by announcing serious rules, their authority appears to encompass
this alternative.

Those familiar with judicial practice in the

United States, however, are likely to find this resolution of the
case surprising and possibly unsettling.48
Now suppose we carry the example further.

In the course of

her deliberation in Edward’s case, Heidi reflects on the problem
of noise in residential neighborhoods.

This reflection leads her

to a fourth conclusion, that the community would be better off if
all residential homeowners mowed their lawns between two and four
o’clock on Saturday afternoons.

The coordination benefits of

such a rule, she concludes, outweigh possible inconveniences to
owners who prefer a different time.

We expect that most people

would find it unseemly, as well as contrary to the ideals of due
process and democratic representation, for Heidi to issue a rule,
“homeowners must mow between two and four o’clock on Saturday
afternoons.”49

Yet once we recognize that judges have rulemaking

authority, the logic of authority places no limit on her power to
issue the rule.

To the extent that judges refrain from issuing

rules of this kind, the disability is self-imposed.
Identification of Precedent Rules.

Another question about

the rule model of the common law arises from the perspective of
later judges: what acts and statements by past courts count as
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binding precedent rules?

Legislative rules may require

interpretation, but identifying the rule is not a problem.
Because courts traditionally have been reluctant to legislate
overtly, their rules can be harder to recognize.

Judicial

opinions typically focus on the immediate task before the court resolution of a particular case.

They are likely to contain a

narrative description of the facts of the dispute, references to
precedent cases, and a more or less complete explanation of the
court’s reasoning, but they may not explicitly announce a rule
for future cases.50
Several necessary conditions for the existence of a serious
precedent rule follow from our understanding of the function of
authoritative rules.

As we explained in Chapter One, communities

recognize rulemaking authorities for the purpose of settling
controversy and uncertainty about the application of shared moral
values.51

To perform the function of settlement, rules must be

general enough to prescribe results in classes of future cases,
determinate enough to provide answers without direct
consideration of the values the rules are designed to serve, and
“serious” in the sense that they preempt further reasoning and
determine results.52
The settlement function of rules also dictates that
precedent rules must be posited by a rulemaking authority - in
this case a prior judge.53

Authoritative rulemaking is an
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intentional act.

The task of the rulemaker is to determine the

best prescription for future cases that can be captured in the
form a rule.

Rulemaking authorities, including judges, are

expected to bring their powers of reason and expertise to bear on
the choice of rules.

It follows, for us, that authoritative

rules take their meaning from their author’s intent.

We will

have more to say about intent-based interpretation of rules in
Chapter Five.

For now, the important point is that precedent

rules come into existence when they are posited by a past judge
and mean what that judge intends them to mean.54
The requirement that precedent rules must be posited does
not necessarily mean that they must appear in canonical form in a
prior opinion.

Often a rule is detectable in explanatory remarks

and citations even if the precedent court did not state the rule
explicitly and flag it as a prescription for future cases.

As

long as the judge had a rule in mind and the rule is capable of
restatement in determinate, canonical form, positing can occur in
an informal way.55

Recognition of informal rules expands the

capacity of the common law to settle future controversy: given
prevailing patterns of judicial opinion-writing, insistence on
explict rules would result in too few rules and too little
settlement.
Thus, it is possible, and probably desirable, to include
implicit precedent rules within the rule model of the common law.
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At the same time, it is important to maintain a distinction
between rules implicitly posited by prior courts and norms
abduced by later courts from the data of past decisions.

A

precedent rule exists only when the precedent judge intended to
adopt or endorse a rule and the rule can be stated in a form that
is capable of governing future disputes.

If these conditions are

met, the precedent court can fairly be viewed as the author of
the rule.

If, however, the conditions we have described are not

present, the current judge is not following a precedent rule.
The current judge is either constructing a norm from the facts
and outcomes of prior cases or simply positing a new rule.

As we

shall explain in our discussion of legal principles in Chapter
Three, a norm constructed from past facts and outcomes is not
posited (either by the past judge or by the current judge); nor
does it constrain the current judge’s decision in any meaningful
way.56
For example: Heidi is presiding over the case of John, who
is planning to open a music store in a residential neighborhood.
Neighboring homeowners have asked Heidi to enjoin John from
opening his store, arguing that the noise it will generate makes
it a nuisance.57

Heidi discovers a prior decision in which a

court held an aerobics studio to be a nuisance in a residential
neighborhood.

The opinion in that case referred to the

likelihood of noise and explained that an aerobics studio would
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place too great a burden on surrounding owners.

It also cited

cases from other jurisdictions holding that a trumpet academy, an
amusement park, and an ice cream truck were nuisances in
residential neighborhoods but a chess tournament was not.

Heidi

can infer from this opinion that the precedent judge established
applied a rule, “noisy activities are not permitted in
residential neighborhoods.”
Suppose, however, that instead of the opinion just
described, Heidi finds an array of past cases holding that an
aerobics studio, a trumpet academy, an amusement park, and an ice
cream truck were nuisances in residential neighborhoods but a
chess tournament was not.

In each case, the court stated only

that the activity in question placed an unreasonable burden on
surrounding owners.

In this version of the example, Heidi has

no basis for inferring a rule against noisy activities in
residential neighborhoods.

She can posit a serious rule to this

effect, or construct a principle that appears to fit the pattern
of prior decisions, but there is no precedent rule in place to
prescribe the decision she should reach in John’s case.
Precedent rules must be posited, general, determinate, and
preemptive: this much is implied by the concept of authoritative
rules.

The rule model of common law, in itself, places no

further limits on what should count as a precedent rule.

As we

have noted, however, judges, as adjudicators, are not ideally
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situated to make rules.

To counteract the risk of flawed

precedent rules, they might adopt additional preconditions for
recognition of binding precedent rules.58
One possible way to protect against misconceived rules would
be to deny precedential effect to rules that appear to have been
posited without serious deliberation.

The procedural history of

a decision might reveal that the court announced a rule and
intended it to operate as a rule in future cases, but that the
parties never engaged in full debate about the future
consequences of the rule.59

If so, later courts could disregard

the rule.
A requirement of adequate deliberation might not be
practical, however, at least in the context of current legal
practice.

Evidence of deliberation, such as judicial notes and

records of oral argument, tends to be scant and difficult to
obtain.

Further, regular inquiry into the deliberations leading

up to adoption of rules might undermine the prescriptive effect
of precedent rules.

Following a rule against one’s best judgment

is not rational; therefore a legal system that relies on serious
precedent rules to settle controversy necessarily depends a
general disposition among judges to follow precedent rules
without much reflection.60

Intensive scrutiny of the

deliberations of past judicial rulemakers could undermine the
practice of unreflective rule-following.
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A second possible check on undesirable judicial rules is a
precondition of acceptance over time.

According to this

condition, precedent rules would become binding when, but only
when, they had been “taken up” by a sufficient number of
judges.61

A condition of acceptance over time limits the

precedential effect of judicial rules to rules that have been
studied and approved by multiple judges working in a variety of
contexts: rules come to represent a kind of collective wisdom.62
One difficulty with a precondition of acceptance over time
is indeterminacy.

There is no non-arbitrary point at which a

rule has been sufficiently “taken up” by subsequent courts, and
quantifying the extent of acceptance required would be
impractical.

The indeterminacy of acceptance, however, is like

the indeterminacy of baldness and heaps: there comes a point at
which one knows it has occurred.63
A more difficult question analytically is what exactly must
be accepted.

The intended meaning of a rule may change as judges

apply the rule over time.

For example: a prior opinion contains

the rule “domestic household animals are permissible in
residential neighborhoods.”

The judge who announced the rule

intended the term “household animals” to include horses and
chickens.

Subsequent courts have continued to apply the rule.

Recently, however, courts applying the rule have used the term
“household animals” in a more restrictive way, to mean pets such
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as dogs and cats.

As we have explained, one implication of the

settlement function of rules is that the meaning of rules is a
function of their authors’ intent.

This raises the question, if

precedent rules are not binding until taken up by later judges,
who is the author whose intent governs the meaning of the rule?
The authority of the original judge is incomplete because
that judge alone cannot establish a binding precede rule: the
endorsement of subsequent judges is necessary to place the rule
in force.

This suggests that the subsequent judges who accept a

precedent rule are its authors.

However, the meaning intended by

subsequent judges cannot be the meaning of the rule because that
meaning has not yet been accepted over time.

Nor, for that

matter, can the original judge’s intended meaning be the meaning
of the rule, because that meaning has not met the test of
acceptance.

It appears, therefore, that no effective precedent

rule exists until a further round of acceptance occurs, with all
endorsers concurring in the meaning of the rule as posited by
some prior judge.

This further requirement, of course, adds

greatly to the indeterminacy of the rule, and so is at odds with
the objective of settlement that motivates the rule model of the
common law.
The Persistence of Precedent Rules.

A third question that

arises under the rule model is whether and how later courts can
overrule precedent rules.

An initial point is that altering a
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precedent in any way overrules the rule.

Serious precedent rules

are effective as a means of coordinating conduct and otherwise
reducing error because, and to the extent that, later judges
follow them automatically without looking behind the rules to see
if their underlying reasons require a different result.

It

follows that when a current judge “narrows” a rule by carving out
an exception for a particular case in which the rule’s
prescription appears to be a mistake, the judge is not applying a
modified version of the rule but disregarding the rule and
establishing a new rule in its place.

As we shall explain more

fully in Chapter Three, the original rule places no constraint at
all on the current judge; in effect, the rule is overruled.64
Some power to overrule precedent rules is essential to the
success of the rule model of judicial decisionmaking.

The most

persuasive criticism of the rule model is that serious rules
entrench error.65

Rules may be poorly designed or may become

obsolete, and, as we have noted, judicial rules are especially
susceptible to flaws.

Without some qualification, the rule model

appears to require that judges follow all rules according to
their terms, and so to lock in past errors.
Perpetual entrenchment of flawed rules, however, is not a
necessary implication of serious precedent rules.

Under the rule

model, precedent rules are preemptive in the sense that judges,
in their role as adjudicators, must follow previously announced
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rules even if the reasons behind the rules appear to require a
different outcome in the case before the court.

Yet the rule

model also gives judges rulemaking authority, and in their role
as rulemakers, judges can override rules they believe are
flawed.66
Overruling of precedent rules is appropriate in two
circumstances, and only two.

First, a precedent rule may not be

justified as a rule, either because it was misconceived or
because it has become obsolete.

Rules lack justification if they

cause more error by prescribing erroneous outcomes than they
prevent by coordinating conduct and averting the errors of
natural reasoning.

Second, a precedent rule may be justified in

that it improves on unconstrained decisionmaking, but not
optimal: a rule may prevent more error than it causes, but
prevent less error, or cause more error, than an alternative
rule.

In that case, overruling is appropriate if but only if the

benefits of the alternative rule are greater than the costs of
disrupting the patterns of coordination that have formed around
the existing rule.

At least in theory, judges have the same

power as legislatures to repeal rules when either of these
conditions obtains.

In contrast, overruling is not appropriate

simply because the precedent rule prescribes erroneous outcomes
in some cases.

Errors of this kind are an inevitable feature of

determinate general rules.

If the rule is justified in the sense
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that brings about a net reduction in error, and preferable to any
alternative rule, the rule model requires judges to follow the
rule even when it prescribes the wrong result.
Suppose for example, that Heidi is presiding over the case
of Martha, who keeps a pet pit bull in her home.

Heidi discovers

a precedent case in which the judge announced a rule, “pit bulls
in residential neighborhoods are nuisances per se.”

If this rule

is sound as applied to most pit bulls and superior to any
alternatives, Heidi must apply it to Martha’s pit bull even if
she is convinced that Martha’s pet is gentle, well-behaved, and
unlikely to do harm.

If, however, Heidi believes that the rule

“pit bulls are nuisances per se” is based on faulty empirical
reasoning by a prior judge whose attention was focused on a rare
case of mauling, she can overrule the rule by announcing a
modified rule or simply declaring that no rule shall apply.
Logically, under a rule model of the common law, the powers
of judges and legislators to make and then unmake rules are
coextensive.

Traditionally, however, judges have been reluctant

to overrule precedent rules, at least overtly.67
reasons, this may be a wise course.

For several

The first is that judges

have more opportunities to overrule rules than legislatures: they
are likely to revisit rules frequently as parties bring disputes
one by one before multiple courts.

Their assessment of rules

will sometimes be incorrect, and even when their assessment is
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correct, frequent overruling will undermine the settlement
benefits of common law rules generally.
A second reason for caution in overruling precedent rules is
that judges, unlike legislators, combine their oversight of rules
with the task of adjudication.

The separate standards we have

outlined for applying sound rules and overruling unsound rules
place judges in a difficult position psychologically.

When a

precedent rule is justified overall - when it will prevent more
error than it produces if it is regularly applied - the rule
model of decisionmaking calls for judges to follow the rule
without consulting the reasons behind the rule.

Yet, judges must

consider the same set of reasons to determine whether to
overrule.

If, judged by those reasons, the rule will cause more

error than it prevents, the rule is unjustified and should be
overruled.

If, judged by its underlying reasons, the precedent

rule will cause more error or prevent less error than an
alternative rule, and the benefits of a change outweigh the costs
of disruption, the rule is suboptimal and again should be
overruled.

The problem is that, if the reasons underlying the

rule are available to judges for the purpose of overruling, they
will be hard to suppress for the purpose of application.
Assume, for example, that the rule that pit bulls are
nuisances per se is based on a balance between the welfare that
owners derive from their dogs and the risk of injury to others.

43

Heidi cannot decide for Martha on the ground that these reasons
do not support an injunction in the case of Martha’s dog;
however, she is free to decide that they do not support a rule
against pit bulls.

Locally, these two conclusions are distinct:

one concerns the outcome of the case and the other concerns the
overall performance of the rule.

In practice, however, it will

be difficult for Heidi to compartmentalize in this way,
particularly when she is convinced that an injunction is the
wrong outcome for Martha.
Perhaps this dilemma could be avoided or at least minimized
by a serious rule governing the occasions for overruling.

For

example, a court or legislature might posit a rule such as
“overrule precedent rules that have not been followed for 30
years,” or “overrule precedent rules that have been questioned by
later judges in ten or more cases.”

A rule of this kind,

however, suffers from several difficulties.

It is uncomfortably

blunt because the subject matter of legal rules and the frequency
of litigation in different areas of law varies greatly.
Moreover, the underlying assumption that judges have power to
overrule rules creates a problem of regress.

The overruling rule

(and any higher order overruling rule for overruling rules) can
be overruled.

Ultimately, therefore, the question when to

overrule can only be resolved through moral judgment.
Given the limitations and dilemmas we have described, the
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best approach to overruling probably is a presumptive one.
overruling will lead to too much bad law.

No

Overruling whenever a

precedent rule fails to meet the test of moral justification (net
reduction of error over the long run) will undermine the
settlement value of rules.

The middle ground is a practice of

overruling precedent rules when and only when they are obviously
and significantly flawed in their long term effects.68
This standard is not ideal.

It does not eliminate the

conflict between overruling unjustified rules and applying rules
preemptively in particular cases; and in any event applying a
presumption, like following a rule, is not rational when a judge
believes the rule is moderately but not egregiously flawed.
Presumptive overruling, however, appears to be the only practical
alternative for judges operating within the rule model of
precedent.

45

1. Bentham favored an arrangement along these lines. See Gerald
J. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition 403-08, 453-64
(Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press
1989).
2. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law 4-5
(Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press 1988) (“Our society
has an enormous demand for legal rules that private actors can
live, plan, and settle by.”).
3. See Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence,
Part II, 3 Oxford U. Commonwealth L.J. 1, 11-17 (2003). For an
account of the unwritten character of early common law and the
increasing “textualization” of common law over time, Peter M.
Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, available from Social
Science Research Network, http://ssrn.com/abstract=680901 (2005).
4. See J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 17780, 196-98 (4th ed., London: Butterworth’s Lexis-Nexis, 2002);
J.W. Tubbs, The Common Law Mind: Medieval and Early Modern
Conceptions 42-46 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
2000.
5. See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England
71 (Oxford: Clarendon Press); Tubbs, supra note 4, at 182;
Tiersma, supra note 4, at 17; Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common
Law Jurisprudence, Part I, 2 Oxford U. Commonwealth L.J. 155,
160-62 (2002); Postema, supra note 3, at 11-17. One
manifestation of this idea was a judicial practice of declining
to rule when the judges disagreed among themselves: if judges
disagreed, the opinion of the majority was only weak evidence of
the law. See Baker, supra note 4, at 198.
6. See Postema, supra note 5, at 176-80; Postema, supra note 3,
at 1-11. J.W. Tubbs suggests at least five possible
understandings of the term reason, as used in the Yearbooks and
46

other English sources from the 13th to 17th centuries: equity in
the Aristotelian sense of corrections of the errors of general
rules; natural law; reason in distinction to the will of judges;
internal coherence; “tried reason” tested by experience; and
Coke’s notion of “artificial” reason gained through training and
refined by learned argument. J.W. Tubbs, The Common Law Mind:
Medieval and Early Modern Conceptions 46-52; 68-73; 148-51; 16168 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 2000).
7. See Baker, supra note 4, at 181-86; Tiersma, supra note 3, at
25-51.
8. In the United States, statutes and state constitutions often
require courts to issue written opinions. See Tiersma, supra
note 3, at at 38. Opinions issued by “the court” have replaced
seriatim statements by individual judges, and reports are
official. Id. 39-42.
9.
See David Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined
122-43 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989) (tracing the
evolution of judicial attitudes toward lawmaking in the 18th
century); Tiersma, supra note 3, at 52-69 (reporting findings on
the frequency of explicit judicial statements and quotations of
holdings).
10.

See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 5.

11. For earlier statements of our views on judicial treatment of
precedent, see Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Rule of
Rules: Morality, Rules, and the Dilemmas of Law 136-56 (Durham;
London: Duke University Press 2001); Larry Alexander, Constrained
By Precedent, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1989); Larry Alexander &
Emily Sherwin, Precedent, in Common Law Theory (Douglas Edlin,
ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005).
12. Michael Moore can be read as endorsing this model of the
common law. Michael S. Moore, Precedent, Induction, and Ethical
Generalization, in Precedent in Law 183, 210 (Laurence Goldstein,
ed.)(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1987) (“one sees the common law as
being nothing else but what is morally correct, all things
considered – with the hooker that among those things considered
are some very important bits of institutional history which may
divert the common law considerably from what would be morally
ideal”). However, Moore also expresses sympathy, at least
procedurally, with the notion of reasoning from legal principles
- a notion we criticize in Chapter Three.
See id. at 201.
13. See Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 11, at 145-48 (endorsing
a rule model); Frederick Schauer, Playing By the Rules: A
47

Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Life
and Law 185-187 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1991) (endorsing a rule
model); Alexander, supra note 11 (find a rule model superior to
alternatives); see also Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 52-55, 62-76
(suggesting that courts generally accept a rule model of
precedent, but coupling the rule model with a generous view of
overruling powers).
14. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 14-21, 43-53, 578-82
(Cambridge: Belknap Press 1971); John Rawls, Outline of a
Decision Procedure for Ethics, 60 Phil. Rev. 177 (1951); Norman
Daniels, Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance, 76 J.
Phil. 256 (1979); Howard Klepper, Justification and Methodology
in Practical Ethics, 26 Metaphilosophy 201, 205-06 (1995).
15. Cf. Nicholson v. Connecticut Half-way House, Inc., 218 A.2d
383 (Conn. 1966) (injunction against halfway house on ground of
nuisance).
16. See id. at 385-86. Another common problem requiring
empirical judgment is assessment of damages for harm extending
into the future. See generally Douglas Laycock, Modern American
Remedies 19-37, 201-231 (3d ed., New York: Aspen 2002).
17. See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 10-12 (discussing
“replicability” as a criterion for sound law); Henry M. Hart, Jr.
& Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law 55-58, 568-72 (William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, eds., New York: Foundation Press 1994);
Schauer, supra note 13, at 137-45, 155-58; Stephen R. Perry,
Judicial Obligation, Precedent, and the Common Law, 7 Oxford J.
Legal Stud. 215, 248-49 (1987).
18. See Hart & Sacks, supra note 17, at 155; L.L. Fuller &
William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages, 46 Yale L.J. 52, 62-63 (1946), Andrei Marmor, Should
Like Cases Be Treated Alike?, 11 Legal Theory 33(2005).
19. For discussion of the value of coordination, see, e.g.,
Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 49-50 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press; New York: Oxford University Press 1986); Schauer, supra
note 3, at 162-66; Gerald J. Postema, Coordination and Convention
at the Foundation of Law, 11 Journal of Legal Studies 165, 172-86
(1982); Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value: Reflections on
Raz’s Morality of Freedom, 62 Southern California Law Review 995,
1006-10 (1989).
20. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of
Equality?, 83 Columbia Law Review 1167, 1170-71 (1983); Michael
48

S. Moore, Precedent, Induction, and Ethical Generalization, in
Precedent in Law 183 (Laurence Goldstein, ed.)(Oxford: Clarendon
Press 1987).
21. See John E. Coons, Consistency, 75 California Law Review 59,
102-07 (1987). For more general critiques of equality as a moral
ideal, see Peter Westen, Speaking of Equality: An Analysis of the
Rhetorical Force of “Equality” in Moral and Legal Discourse 11923 (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990); Christopher J.
Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 Harvard Law Review 1210 (1997).
See also Marmor, supra note 18 (acknowledging that equal
treatment has no role to play when there are reasons for
decision, but offering a limited defense of the principle of
equal treatment in the absence of determinative reasons for
decision).
22.

See Marmor, supra note 18.

23. One manifestation of this attitude is the reluctance of
courts to adopt sharing remedies in close cases. Cf. R.H.
Helmholtz, Equitable Division and the Law of Finders, 52 Fordham
L. Rev. 313 (1983) (supporting equitable division but conceding
that courts rarely grant remedies of this kind as a matter of
common law).
24. We take up the problem of interpretation in Part III. In
our view, all rules should be interpreted according to the intent
of their authors (taking into account the authors’ decision to
employ a rule). Interpretation of common law rules follows the
same fundamental principles as interpretation of statutes and
other texts; it differs only in that both the rule and its
“author” may be more difficult to identify.
25. See 8 A.L.R.4th 324 (2004) (collecting cases). See Dr.
Martin M. Moore, Improving the Image and Legal Status of the
Burial Services Industry, 24 Akron L. Rev. 565 (1991).
26. See Schauer, supra note 13, at 94-100; Frederick Schauer,
Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 645, 676
n.66 (1991). Rule sensitive particularism is discussed in
Chapter 1, supra, n.19 & accompanying text.
27. See Raz, supra note 19, at 17-62; Joseph Raz, The Authority
of Law 16-19, 22-23, 30-33 (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York:
Oxford University Press 1979).
28. We discuss refinements of the rule model later in the
chapter. See text at notes ?, infra.
49

29. See Sir Matthew Hale, The History of the Common Law of
England 45 (1713) (Charles M. Gary ed., Chicago: University of
Chicago Press 1971); 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England 69-70 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1765); Tubbs,
supra note 4, at 182; Postema, supra note 5, at 166-67. But cf.
Baker, supra note 4, at 200 (suggesting that the ranks of judges
have always included both “timid souls” and “bold spirits”).
For modern descriptions of legal decision-making that come
close to the classic understanding, see Lloyd L. Weinrib, Legal
Reason: The Use of Analogy in Legal Argument 147-52 (2005)
(associating the rule of law with the idea that courts “are not
to decide for themselves what the law is but are to seek it out,
to discover and apply it as it is,” but also maintaining that the
process of declaring law entails judgment as well as reason).
See also Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 82 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press 1977) (“Judges should apply the law that
other institutions have made; they should not make new law”);
A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in Osford Essays
in Jurisprudence 77, 84-86 (Second Series, A.W.B. Simpson, ed.,
Oxford: Clarendon Press 1973) (“common law rules enjoy whatever
status they possess not because of the circumstances of their
origin, but because of their continued reception”).
30. See Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process
124-25 (New Haven: Yale University Press 1921) (“Since the days
fo Bentham and Austin, no one, it is believed, has accepted [the
theory that judges do not legislate] without deduction or
reserve”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law 4-7
(1988) (maintaining that courts inevitably make law, not only as
a by-product of adjudication but also to enrich the body of legal
rules).
31. See Schauer, supra note 4, at 31-34, 48-54; Chapter One,
supra, text at note 17.
32. On the benefits of rules, see Chapter One, text at notes 1011, supra.
33. See Raz, supra note 19, at 70-80 (discussing the “normal
justification” of authority).
34. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. Chi. L.
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Chapter Three: The Mystification of Common-Law Reasoning
We argued in Chapter Two that there are two and only two
plausible models of judicial reasoning: the natural model and the
rule model.

The natural model incorporates two forms of

reasoning: moral reasoning through the method of reflective
equilibrium and empirical reasoning.

The rule model adds a third

form of reasoning, deduction from authoritative rules.

These

forms of reasoning are not unique to law, but are common to all
subjects of human deliberation.

In our view, they are the only

tools judges need to decide cases and the only tools they use in
fact.
This is not the prevailing view.

Texts on judicial

reasoning, as well as judges themselves, often maintain that the
primary decisionmaking method of the common law is reasoning by
analogy.1

Analogical reasoning is the special art of lawyers and

judges and the means by which the common law has successfully
adapted to changing social conditions.2

Commentators also

maintain that courts reason from legal principles, a method
closely linked to the method of analogy.3
In this chapter, we intend to demonstrate that judges cannot
be doing what they claim.

One cannot “reason” by analogy, and

legal principles are chimerical.

We shall argue as well that if

analogies and legal principles could in fact affect the course of
judicial reasoning, the results would be pernicious.

1

Our position raises several questions.

One is descriptive:

what are judges doing when they claim to reason by analogy or to
apply legal principles?

We suggest in Chapter Four that

searching for analogies and common principles that link past and
present cases is a professional habit that can play a useful role
in the development of common law.

It is, however, only a habit:

analogies and legal principles do not decide cases.
A second question is why judges, teachers, and textwriters
find the idea of judicial reliance on analogies and legal
principles so appealing.

One explanation for the popularity of

this account of judicial decisionmaking is that it appears to
provide a way out of the stark choice presented by the natural
and rule models of decisionmaking.

If all judicial reasoning is

natural reasoning, there is no meaningful “common law” that can
curb the errors and biases of individual judges.

The rule of law

is imperiled, at least in the absence of legislation.

If, on the

other hand, precedent rules are serious rules, then judges must
set aside their best moral judgment and decide as the rules
require.

Analogies and legal principles seem to offer a middle

course: they constrain judicial judgment without displacing it.
Our analysis, however, suggests that the compromise is illusory.
Natural decisionmaking and rule-governed decisionmaking are the
only courses open to judges.

2

Analogical Reasoning from Case to Case
In the purest sense, analogical reasoning in law means
reasoning directly from one case to another.4

The judge observes

the facts and outcome of a past case, compares the facts of the
past case to those of a pending case, then reaches a decision in
the pending case based on similarities and differences between
the cases.
reasons.

This form of reasoning has popular appeal for several
As we have just noted, it promises a happy medium

between constraint and flexibility.

Judges must conform their

decisions to the course of prior adjudication, but they are not
precluded from assessing the merits of cases before them and they
have considerable leeway to expand on or distinguish the past
conclusions of their colleagues.5

Analogical reasoning also

conforms to a supposed principle of justice: treat like alike.6
Another possible reason for the broad appeal of analogical
reasoning is that findings of similarity and difference among
cases may be acceptable to parties who disagree at the more
abstract level of moral principle.7
Judges use, or claim to use, case-to-case analogies in three
ways.

First, the outcome of a precedent case may dictate a like

outcome in the new case if the cases are factually similar.8
Second, the outcome of a precedent case may dictate the outcome
of new case a fortiori, because the new case presents at least as
strong a case for the same result.9
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These two versions of the

analogical method are thought to be sources of constraint: the
analogy between precedent case and new case is a reason, and
possibly a conclusive reason, for the court in the new case to
reach a result that parallels the result of the precedent case,
even if the court believes, all things considered, that the
result is wrong.

In effect, the precedent court exercises

authority by describing a set of facts and determining an outcome
that can control the outcome of later cases.
The third way in which courts purport to reason by analogy
is to “distinguish” precedent rules based on factual
dissimilarities between the cases in which the rules were
announced and new cases that appear to fall within the rules’
terms.10

Distinguishing is the flip side of a fortiori

decisionmaking, in that disanalogy provides an escape from
authority.

The precedent court exercises lawmaking authority by

announcing a general rule, but the court in a new case can avoid
the rule and return to natural reasoning.
Constraint by Similarity.

The simplest and most common way

in which courts use analogies is by finding that the case before
them is similar to a precedent case and then proceeding to reach
a parallel result.

For example: Heidi is called on to decide a

nuisance action against Karl, who is keeping an ocelot in his
house.

Surrounding homeowners point to a past case in which the

court enjoined Edward to remove his pet bear from a residential
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neighborhood.

An ocelot, they say, is like a bear, so Heidi

should likewise order Karl to remove it.
The homeowners in this case presumably are invoking the
maxim that like cases should be treated alike.

We have already

explained why, in our view, like treatment has no moral value in
sequential decisionmaking.11

But suppose we assume, for the

purpose of argument, that the principle of like treatment is
sound.

The difficulty with the analogy between Karl’s ocelot and

Edward’s bear - and with any analogy of this kind - is that,
without more, it is impossible to say that the two cases are
either alike or different.
As a factual matter, there are an infinite number of
similarities and differences between the ocelot and the bear.12
Both are predators that might harm a small child, both are
difficult to domesticate, and both are furry mammals.

On the

other hand, Karl’s ocelot is (we can assume) smaller than
Edward’s bear, it is a type of feline indigenous to Belize, and
it has spots.

Nothing in the outcome of Edward’s case - Edward

was made to give up his bear - picks out which of these
similarities and differences are important for purposes of
comparison.

Karl can just as easily point to another past case

in which Herman was allowed to keep a Dalmatian in a residential
neighborhood.

Herman’s Dalmatian, he might say, was about that

same size as his ocelot and, like his ocelot, it had spots.
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Where are we now?
Our point is that Heidi cannot reason that Karl’s case and
Edward’s case should be decided alike because they are similar.
To reason that they should be decided alike, she must determine
that they are importantly similar, and to reason that they are
importantly similar, she must refer to some general proposition
that links ocelots to bears.

Without this additional link, the

facts and outcome of Edward’s case have nothing to say about
Karl’s case.13
In a recent book defending analogical reasoning in law,
Lloyd Weinreb rejects the conclusion that analogies depend on
supporting generalizations.14

Weinreb cites as an example an

opinion in which the New York Court of Appeals held the owner of
a steamboat strictly liable for losses suffered by a passenger
whose money was stolen from a stateroom.15

The court cited two

possible lines of precedent: a series of cases holding that
innkeepers were strictly liable for thefts from guest rooms, and
another series of cases holding that railroads were not strictly
liable for thefts from sleeping cars.

Ultimately, the Court of

Appeals found steamboats to be more like inns than like railroads
and held for the passenger.16

In Weinreb’s view, this

demonstrates that courts can and do decide cases on the basis of
factual similarity, without reference to general propositions
that make certain similarities relevant to the outcome.17
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We observe, first, that the court’s failure to refer
explicitly to a general rule linking steamboats to inns does not
establish that it decided the case without the aid of a
generalization.

Judicial opinions, particularly opinions from

the days of steamboats when courts were reticent about
rulemaking, may not spell out every step of the courts’
reasoning.

In any event, our point is not that courts must

engage in formal rulemaking in order to draw analogies, but only
that the reasoning they engage in to reach decisions must refer
to some general proposition that supports the analogy.

The Court

of Appeals may well have had in mind that businesses providing
lodging are strictly liable for thefts from rooms if the
accommodation is of such a type that guests are likely to expect
protection, or that providers of lodging are in a better position
than guests to furnish protection.18
If, on the other hand, Weinreb is correct that the court
detected a similarity between steamboats and inns without relying
on a supporting generalization, the analogy has no power of
constraint.

Suppose the Court of Appeals had reached the

opposite conclusion, that steamboats are like railroads, and
therefore that they are not strictly liable for thefts.

As a

matter of similarity, this is fair enough: steamboats and
railroads are both mobile.

Thus, if nothing more than brute

similarity were involved, the steamboat-railroad analogy would be
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equally as valid as the steamboat-inn analogy and, consequently,
equally incapable of determining the outcome of the case.
We can press our point further by examining more closely
what might be involved in drawing an analogy.

There are several

ways in which Heidi might reason to the conclusion that ocelots
and bears are importantly alike for the purpose of an action of
nuisance.

She might formulate a moral principle and test her

initial judgment through the method of reflective equilibrium:
the liberty of property owners to use their property as they wish
is subject to a duty to not to inflict an unreasonable risk of
harm on others, and both ocelots and bears pose unreasonable
risks of harm.19

More likely, Heidi will refer to a rule that

captures applicable moral principles in more concrete terms:
dangerous wild animals should not be kept in residential
neighborhoods, and both ocelots and bears are dangerous wild
animals.20

Once Heidi has arrived at a morally sound principle

or rule, she can deduce from it that ocelots and bears are
importantly similar, and enjoin Karl.
Notice that when Heidi reasons in either of these ways - by
reference to a moral principle or by reference to a less abstract
rule - the outcome of the prior case against Edward plays no
effective role in her decision.

The reason for granting an

injunction against Karl is not that his ocelot is similar to
Edward’s bear, but that his ocelot falls within a general
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principle or rule that Heidi has now determined is sound and
should apply.

The principle or rule is both necessary and

sufficient to decide Karl’s case, and the fact that the same
principle or rule applies to Edward’s case as well has no effect
on the outcome.

Another way to put this is that the lawmaker who

settles Karl’s case is not the judge in Edward’s case, but the
new judge, Heidi, who exercises authority by formulating a
principle or rule.

The reasoning Heidi uses to arrive at her

decision is not a special “analogical” form of reasoning, but
ordinary moral reasoning and deductive reasoning.
A third way in which Heidi might be said to reason to the
conclusion that Karl’s ocelot should be treated in like manner as
Edward’s bear is by referring to a legal principle that
establishes similarity between the cases.

A legal principle is a

general proposition that is consistent with existing legal
materials, including the outcomes of past cases.21

For example:

past cases include the decision enjoining Edward to remove his
bear and another decision permitting Jerome to keep his pet
crocodile.

The combination of precedents might support the legal

principle that dangerous furry wild animals are not permissible
in residential neighborhoods.

Heidi can then deduce from this

principle that Karl’s ocelot must be removed.

This method of

decision-making, unlike the methods just described, accords a
role to past outcomes.

The legal principle (no dangerous furry
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wild animals) decides the case against Karl, but the prior
decision in favor of Jerome limits the principle’s content.
If in fact legal principles are viable entities, then
analogical decisionmaking on the basis of legal principles is a
form of reasoning that is, arguably, unique to law.

We take up

the subject of reasoning from legal principles in the second half
of this chapter.22

For now, it is enough to say that we reject

the notion of legal principles as both incoherent and
undesirable.

It follows that for us, decisions that appear to

treat past outcomes as grounds for decision in current cases are
in fact either instances of ordinary moral reasoning or instances
of deduction from rules.
A fourth possibility is that Heidi might rely directly on a
perception of similarity: ocelots and bears are alike when placed
in residential neighborhoods.

At this point, we must distinguish

between reasoning and intuition.

A lifetime of experience may

allow Heidi to identify and apply a supporting general rule so
rapidly that she herself is unaware of all the steps involved.
If so, she has reasoned to a conclusion, in an abbreviated way.
Alternatively, Heidi may simply perceive an important likeness
between ocelots and bears, perhaps because they evoke a similar
emotional response (fear) or because Heidi’s mind is wired to
respond to problems by through pattern recognition and
metaphor.23
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As a psychological matter, we cannot say which of these
descriptions is most likely to be correct.

We can say, however,

that if Heidi’s response is purely intuitive it is not a form of
reasoning.24

Reasoning entails, at a minimum, a process of

thought that one can articulate to oneself and to others.

A coin

toss is not a form of reasoning; nor is a perceived analogy.
Whatever psychological mechanism allows judges to class ocelots
and bears together for purposes of residential land use, the
classification is not a reasoned one unless it refers to some
more general proposition that links common properties of ocelots
and bears to problem the judge is trying to solve.
At this point, the proponent of analogical decisionmaking
may say fine, what Heidi is doing is not reasoning as you define
it.

But it is what judges do.

this way.

They manage to decide cases in

This is, in effect, Weinreb’s argument for analogical

reasoning in law.25
To answer this argument, we first point out that the subject
under discussion is analogical reasoning as a form of constraint.
Precedent outcomes are supposed to dictate, or at least to
provide reasons for, parallel outcomes in cases judged to be
similar.

With this assumption in place, we can return to Heidi’s

decision and consider more closely how she might reach it.
Suppose first that Heidi looks at the precedent case
involving Edward’s bear and has an intuition of important
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similarity between Edward’s bear and Karl’s ocelot.

She then

hypothesizes a general proposition that supports her intuition:
dangerous wild animals should not be kept in residential
neighborhoods.

If she is satisfied with this proposition as a

reason for decision, and if she confirms that both ocelots and
bears are dangerous wild animals, she will enter an injunction
against Karl.26

We have no difficulty with this method of

decisionmaking, but it is not truly an analogical method.
Assuming our description of Heidi’s mental process is correct,
the intuition of important similarity plays only a minor role, as
the inspiration for a more complete process of reasoning.

Nor

does the outcome of Edward’s case constrain Heidi’s decision.
The lawmaker is not the precedent judge, but Heidi, who engages
in ordinary moral and deductive reasoning, with the help of
intuition, to formulate a rule of decision.
Now suppose that Heidi first reasons to a tentative
conclusion about Karl’s case: she determines that, based on an
appropriate balance of liberty and protection against harm, she
should permit Karl to keep his ocelot.

She then studies Edward’s

case and has an intuition of important similarity between
Edward’s case and Karl’s.

Next, she hypothesizes a general

proposition that supports her intuition of similarity: dangerous
wild animals should not be kept in residential neighborhoods.
She tests this proposition with further examples (crocodiles,
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lions), finds that it fits her intuitions about these cases and
also seems to fit her beliefs about liberty and harm.
Ultimately, she abandons her initial conclusion, applies the
proposition that dangerous wild animals should not be kept in
residential neighborhoods, and enters an injunction against Karl.
Again, Heidi’s decision is not truly analogical; her method is
ordinary reasoning and Edward’s case does not constrain the
outcome.

Heidi’s intuition of important similarity between

Karl’s ocelot and Edward’s bear simply triggered a reasoned
reexamination of her original position.
Another possibility is that Heidi begins by reasoning to a
conclusion in favor of Karl, based on the comparative moral value
of liberty and protection against harm.

She then studies

Edward’s case and has an intuition of important similarity
between Karl’s ocelot and Edward’s bear.

Without more, she

decides to treat the two cases alike and order Karl to remove his
ocelot from the neighborhood.

This reconstruction supports the

possibility of a purely analogical approach to judicial
decisionmaking, but it strikes us as implausible.

There is

nothing in Heidi’s unconscious and inaccessible intuition of
similarity between ocelots and bears that provides a reason
capable of overriding the conclusions she has reached through a
process of moral reasoning.

Only if she can construct a

justification for the intuition, as in the prior example, will
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she abandon her reasoned moral judgment.
The possibility that poses the greatest difficulty for our
position is this: Heidi begins with an intuition of important
similarity between ocelots and bears.

She then decides to reason

no further and decide Karl’s case as the precedent judge decided
Edward’s case: remove the ocelot.

Assuming that it is in fact

psychologically possible for Heidi to intuit important similarity
without referring to a supporting generalization, this is a
genuinely analogical decision.

Given Heidi’s intuition, the

precedent outcome controls the outcome of Karl’s case.

The

lawmaker is the precedent judge, who has exercised authority by
describing facts and reaching a decision that dictates a like
decision in Karl’s case.

This is, however, a very impoverished

view of judicial decisionmaking, which we are reluctant to
attribute to judges adjudicating in good faith.

The intuition of

important similarity on which it relies is completely opaque: it
provides no warrant - no accessible justifying reason - for
Heidi’s decision.

We emphasize again that the two cases are not

identical; they are only felt to be similar (why?).

There is no

way even to think about whether Heidi’s judgment of important
similarity is right or wrong.27
At this point, our argument is partly a normative one.

As

an analytical matter, we can say that purely intuitive analogical
decisionmaking is not a form of reasoning.
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We can also say that

what appears to be analogical decisionmaking may in fact be
ordinary reasoning.

Finally, we can return to one of the basic

assumptions we made in our initial discussion of settlement as a
social end and a justification for authority: the assumption that
settlement, as a social end, means reasoned settlement.28
Members of a community choose an authority to translate values
they recognize as reasons for action into particular decisions or
rules when their own judgments conflict.

Whether the authority’s

conclusion is right or wrong, it is expected that the process of
translation will be capable, at least in principle, of
articulation and justification.

Otherwise, the choice of an

authority is no different from the flip of a coin.

This leads to

the normative point: judicial decisionmaking, as an exercise of
authority, ought to meet this minimal requirement, and therefore
ought to entail more than blind, untested, and untestable
intuition.
A Fortiori Constraint.

We have argued that factual

similarities between cases cannot constrain judicial
decisionmaking.

Similarities are infinite; therefore some rule

or principle is necessary to identify important similarities.
Once a court has identified such a rule or principle, the rule or
principle, rather than the factual similarities themselves,
determines the outcome of the pending case.

Analogy alone,

therefore, does not enable courts to extend the “law” of past
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cases into new domains.
It might be argued, however, that analogies can play a more
limited role in judicial decisionmaking by dictating outcomes “a
fortiori.”29

In this version of analogical reasoning, the court

compares the relative strength of two sets of facts - the facts
of the precedent case and the facts of a new case now under
consideration.

If the facts of the new case provide support for

the outcome reached in the precedent case that is stronger than
the support provided by the facts of the precedent case itself,
then it follows, a fortiori, that the new court should reach a
parallel result.
For example: Heidi is considering a nuisance claim against
Felix, who has established a private zoo in a residential
neighborhood.
python.

On display at the zoo are a bear, a lion, and a

Heidi discovers a prior case in which a court ordered

Edward to remove his pet bear from a residential neighborhood.
fortiori, Heidi should order Felix to close his zoo.

This

conclusion follows even if Heidi believes Edward’s case was
wrongly decided, and, accordingly, would have held for Felix in
the absence of Edward’s case.
The a fortiori method of decisionmaking appears more
promising as a form of case-to-case reasoning than a method that
relies solely on the court’s sense of similarity.

Here, the

court compares cases and draws what appears to be a necessary
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A

conclusion about the outcome of one from the facts and outcome of
another.

As we shall demonstrate, however, a fortiori reasoning

suffers from a number of problems that diminish the effect of the
precedent case to the vanishing point.

Moreover, to the extent

that a fortiori comparisons do in fact dictate outcomes, the
possibility of erroneous precedents grossly distorts their
operation.

Given the presence of even a few past mistakes, a

fortiori analogies can wreak havoc with the overall body of law.
The first hurdle in a fortiori reasoning is determining what
facts are in play.

The present judge, Heidi, does not have

access to all the facts of precedent case (the case of Edward’s
bear).

The parties’ lawyers will have selected a subset of all

the facts pertaining to Edward and his bear for presentation to
the court, and the judge (or an appellate court) is likely to
have culled the evidence further in composing an opinion.

One

possibility for Heidi is to assume that the comparison must be
between the classes of facts named by the prior court and the
facts of her new case.

If the court in Edward’s case mentioned

only that Edward was keeping a “bear,” then the presence of any
type of bear can support a claim of nuisance.30

This approach

could result in significant constraint: a precedent court could,
by design or by mistake, exert a very strong influence on future
cases by casting its description of facts in general terms.
the same time, it could produce unwanted results.
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At

An opinion in

Edward’s case stating that Edward was keeping an animal would
result in a great many a fortiori nuisances, not all sensible.
As a result, courts are more likely to take the view that
the appropriate comparison is between particulars actually
described in the prior opinion and the facts of the new case.31
If the court in Edward’s case stated without further elaboration
that Edward was keeping a “bear,” then details about the bear in
Felix’s zoo might serve to distinguish the case against Felix.
Once judges take this more creative approach to factual
comparison of cases, however, an a fortiori effect is very easy
to avoid.

No two cases are perfectly identical in their facts,

and the current judge need only pick out some feature of his or
her case that was not mentioned in the precedent opinion and
that, if it was not in fact present in the precedent case, tip
the scales in favor of a new result.
sympathetic to Felix’s zoo.

Assume that Heidi is

If Felix’s bear is declawed and kept

in a sturdy cage, and if the opinion in Edward’s case does not
specify that Edward’s bear was likewise declawed and kept in a
sturdy cage, Heidi can treat these as distinguishing facts.
Morever, in any case in which the a fortiori effect of a
precedent case makes a difference to the current judge’s decision
- that is, in any case in which the judge would otherwise reach a
different result - we can assume that the judge will be tempted
to manipulate factual assumptions in this way to avoid a result
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the judge thinks is wrong.
In theory, factual comparisons between cases are not
infinitely manipulable.

The judge must identify facts that tip

the scales, or in other words, facts about the new case that, if
not also present in the precedent case, make the new case a
weaker case for the precedent outcome.

This leads to another

problem, which is how a judge can “weigh” facts in favor of one
outcome or another.
To weigh the facts of two cases, the judge must first
determine what outcome particular facts tend to favor, and then
assign a weight to that tendency.32

The tendency of a fact may

seem obvious: the large size of a bear favors an order to remove
the bear from a residential neighborhood.
simple a matter as it first appears.
in itself recommend an injunction.

But this is not as

The size of a bear does not
Bear size must be linked to

bear removal either by an inaccessible intuition or by a process
of reasoning that relies on general propositions: owners must not
impose unreasonable risks on the safety of those around them, and
large bears pose a greater safety risk than small bears.33

In

other words, a fortiori reasoning runs aground for the same
reasons that simple similarity-based analogies run aground: facts
alone have no implications for future decisionmaking.
A further problem is that if the new case involves facts
that tend both in favor of and against the outcome of the
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precedent case, the court must assign weight to the facts in
order to determine whether the a fortiori effect of the precedent
case is dispelled.

This may not be possible if the tendencies of

different facts depend on wholly different values.

For example:

Felix’s zoo contains not only a bear but other animals as well, a
fact that presumably favors an injunction.

Suppose, however,

that Felix’s zoo also doubles as a breeding facility for
endangered species, a fact that favors a decision for Felix.

If

human safety and preservation of species are incommensurable
values, neither of which has lexical priority, there is no way to
weigh them in the manner an a fortiori comparison calls for.
Calculation of the relative strength of additional animals (in
favor of

an injunction) and a breeding program (against an

injunction) requires either a ranking of values or a common
metric for measurement.34
Some moral systems, such as utilitarianism, provide a
universal metric that allows, in principle, for quantitative
comparison of the facts of past and present cases.

Within a

system of this kind, a fortiori comparisons may be logically, if
not practically, possible.
nonsensical.

The consequences, however, are

We must assume that, in any legal system, some

precedent cases have been erroneously decided: if judges always
decided correctly, there would be no need for precedential
constraint.

We must also assume that, but for precedent case,
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the judge in the new case would decide the new case differently;
otherwise the precedent would have no effect.

In these

circumstances, a process of quantitative comparison yields
results that are perverse and ultimately self-contradictory.35
To illustrate: homeowners have asked Heidi to enjoin Max
from opening a gas station in their neighborhood.36

After

calculating potential decreases in human happiness from traffic,
fumes, and aesthetic offense, as well as potential increases in
happiness from financial profit, convenience, and employment,
Heidi finds that the gas station is likely cause a net loss of
three utils.
injunction.

Accordingly, she is inclined to grant an
Max, however, points to a prior case in which Jerome

was allowed to keep a crocodile in a residential neighborhood.
These cases may not appear to have much in common.

But assume

Heidi believes the prior decision was wrong: by her calculation,
Jerome’s crocodile was likely (ex ante) to cause a net loss of 6
utils.

Max can now argue that in any case in which a use of land

will cause a net loss of six or fewer utils, Jerome’s case is an
a fortiori precedent for denying an injunction.

In fact, if

utils are the denominator for comparison, Max might be able to
cite a wholly unrelated precedent - say, an erroneous decision in
the field of contract law - as a reason to decide in his favor.
Alternatively, Heidi might compare potential gains and
losses of utility.37

Assume that the court in Jerome’s case
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concluded, erroneously, that the happiness Jerome would gain from
his crocodile exceeded the loss of happiness his neighbors would
suffer from contemplating the risks posed by a crocodile residing
nearby.

Heidi believes that in Max’s case, the neighbors’

potential loss

of happiness due to traffic, fumes, and aesthetic

offense will exceed Max’s and others’ gains in happiness due to
profits, convenience, and employment.

But if she also concludes

that fumes, traffic and aesthetic loss from Max’s gas station
will cause a lesser loss of happiness than the proximity of
Jerome’s crocodile was likely to cause, and that profit,
convenience, and employment from the gas station will produce
more gains in happiness than Jerome’s enjoyment of his crocodile,
then she is again constrained, a fortiori, to deny the injunction
against Max.

(Heidi believes that in Max’s case, fact set x

outweighs fact set y; but in the precedent case, fact set b was
found to outweigh fact set a; if a outweighs x and y outweighs b,
then the precedent case demands that Heidi treat y as if it
outweighs x.)

This cannot be a sensible way to resolve the

dispute.
The problem is compounded by the presence of both correct
and incorrect precedents.
precedents.

Assume that Heidi discovers two

One is Jerome’s case, in which the court denied an

injunction, resulting in a net loss, ex ante, of six utils.
other is Edward’s case, in which the court ordered Edward to
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The

remove his bear.

Heidi determines that Edward’s case was correct

and that it resulted in a net gain, ex ante, of one util.

These

two cases stand as precedents both for granting and for denying
an injunction in Max’s case (and in all other cases in which the
sum of expected utils if an injunction is granted is between one
and six).
Perhaps a fortiori decisionmaking can be redescribed in a
way that gives guidance to courts in comparing the facts of past
and present cases.

Grant Lamond suggests that precedent requires

later courts to assume that precedent cases were correctly
decided on their facts.38

According to Lamond’s “reason-based”

account of precedent, a later court must accept the “ratio” of a
precedent case - - the proposition supporting its outcome - as a
sufficient reason for the outcome in the factual context of the
precedent case.39

Then, if the facts entailed by the ratio of

the precedent case are present in a later case, the later court
must reach a parallel result unless additional facts create a
reason for a different outcome that is strong enough to defeat
the reason given by the precedent ratio.

If no such facts

appear, the prior case is an a fortiori precedent.

Lamond refers

to this a “reason-based” account of precedent because it compares
the reasons that justify outcomes in the context of particular
facts.40
For example: homeowners have asked Heidi to enjoin Max from
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opening a gas station.

Heidi finds a precedent case in which the

presiding judge stated that “businesses that significantly
increase traffic in residential neighborhoods are nuisances” and
enjoined construction of a Pizza Hut.41

Heidi must grant the

injunction against Max unless she concludes that the convenience
of a local gas station defeats the burden of significant new
traffic.
Assuming that Heidi must accept the precedent judge’s
statement of the ratio of its decision,42 the precedent opinion
appears to constrain Heidi by providing a reason that must be
overcome: protection of homeowners against business traffic.
Suppose, however, that Heidi believes that the precedent judge’s
reasoning was wrong; in her view, traffic is unavoidable if the
neighborhood is to have normal amenities.

If so the reason

generated by the new fact (local gas is convenient) will always
be “stronger” than the reason for the precedent outcome, from
Heidi’s point of view.

Again, there is no real limit on what

Heidi can decide.
A fortiori decisionmaking has one virtue: it taps the
ability of reasoners to make comparative judgments.

Comparing

the degree to which a certain property is present in two objects
- light A is brighter than light B - is an easier task for the
human mind to manage than determining an absolute value - how
bright is light A?43

Thus, judges can make a fortiori judgments
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about past and present cases with greater confidence than they
can assess present cases in isolation.

Yet this does not mean

that judges can reason from case to case without more.

A

comparison of cases is possible only by reference to a general
proposition that identifies which features the cases should be
compared.

To know that lights A and B should be judged on the

scale of brightness, one first must have in mind a rule, “choose
the brightest light.”
Distinguishing Precedents.

A third form of analogical

decisionmaking, very popular among courts, is the use of
dissimilarities to avoid the implications of precedent rules.

If

a new case falls within the terms of a precedent rule, but
includes facts that are not specifically mentioned in the rule
and were not present in the precedent case in which the rule was
announced, the court can “distinguish” the new case and reach a
result contrary to what the rule prescribes.44
Distinguishing precedents can be seen as the reverse of
expansion of precedents on the basis of similarity: here, the
court limits the effect of precedents on the basis of
dissimilarity.

The process of distinguishing precedents can also

be conceived of as a reverse a fortiori calculation.

The new

court is free to reach a new result if the facts of the new case
provide weaker support for the precedent outcome than the facts
of the precedent case.45
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For example: Andrei is considering a nuisance claim against
Herman, who is keeping a large dog in a residential neighborhood.
He discovers a prior case in which Heidi ordered Karl to give up
his ocelot and stated that “large animals in residential
neighborhoods are nuisances per se.”
Heidi’s rule, Herman’s dog must go.

By the general terms of
According to conventional

understanding, however, Andrei can distinguish the precedent rule
on the ground that Herman’s dog, unlike Karl’s ocelot, is a
domestic animal, and the rule does not say in so many words that
large domestic animals are nuisances per se.

As a consequence,

the precedent rule is modified to provide that “large wild
animals in residential neighborhoods are nuisances per se.”
The first point we wish to make about the practice of
distinguishing is that it is not, as is sometimes suggested, a
qualified version of the rule model of precedent.46

Andrei

appears to consult a precedent rule (no large animals), identify
a fact about Herman’s case that is not named in the predicate of
the rule, restate the rule in a modified form (no large wild
animals), and apply it to the case before him.

But in fact, the

precedent rule plays no rule in Andrei’s decision.
To see this, suppose that the new case before Andrei is the
case of Jerome, who is keeping a pet crocodile in his home.
Andrei is sympathetic to Jerome.

Suppose further that in the

precedent case, Heidi ordered Karl to remove his ocelot from a
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residential neighborhood and stated a rule, “wild animals in
residential neighborhoods are nuisances per se.”
this precedent,

To distinguish

Andrei can point to the fact that Jerome’s

crocodile, unlike Karl’s ocelot, has no fur.

The precedent rule

does not specifically mention animals without fur, therefore
Andrei is free to decide in favor of Jerome.

Moreover, this type

of distinction will always be possible, because no precedent rule
can be specific enough to cover all the particulars of all future
cases.

No matter what the rule, Andrei will be able to find some

fact about Jerome’s case that the rule does not particularly
name.

It follows that the rule has no constraining effect on the

outcome of the case.
Joseph Raz has suggested that the practice of distinguishing
precedents, as conventionally understood, constrains judges by
limiting the manner in which they can modify precedent rules.47
According to Raz, a judge seeking to distinguish a precedent rule
must restate the rule in a way that meets two conditions: the
modified rule must be the precedent rule with some further
condition added, and the modified rule must support the outcome
of the precedent case.

He illustrates with an example in which

the precedent case involved facts a, b, c, d, and e, the result
was X, and the opinion announced a rule “if A, B and C, then X.”
The new case involves facts a, b, c, d, and f, but not e.

The

court can distinguish the new case and announce a modified rule
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“if A, B, C, and E, then X,” or a modified rule, “if A, B, C, and
not F, then X.”

But it cannot announce a modified rule “if A, B,

C, and not D, then X, because this rule does not support the
outcome of the precedent case.48
In our view, this constraint is illusory.

Assume again that

in Karl’s case, Heidi announced the rule “wild animals in
residential neighborhoods are nuisances per se.”

Andrei

distinguishes Jerome’s case on the ground that Jerome’s crocodile
has no fur.

He then announces a rule, “furry wild animals in

residential neighborhoods are nuisances per se.”

This may not be

an ideal rule, and it authorizes a result that seems contrary to
the values the precedent rule was designed to protect; but it
meets Raz’s two conditions: it is the precedent rule with a
condition added, and it justifies the outcome of the precedent
case.

Nor do Raz’s conditions guarantee that the modified rule

will be similar in effect to the precedent rule.

Andrei could

announce a rule, “wild animals that are three year-old ocelots
with one lame foot are nuisances per se” without running afoul of
the supposedly constraining conditions.

But the pattern of

future nuisance decisions under the rule will be radically
different from the pattern one would have expected under Heidi’s
rule, “wild animals are nuisances per se.”
Raz alludes to a third possible condition, that the court
should adopt “only that modification which will best improve the
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rule.”49

From the standpoint of a judge who thinks the precedent

rule is misconceived, however, any narrowing of the rule is an
improvement, and the narrowest version may be the best, however
ungainly.

A condition requiring that any modification of the

precedent rule must serve the purposes of the rule, or that any
modification must conform to common sense, might help to solve
the problem.50

But these conditions are too indeterminate to

provide effective constraint.
Thus, when judges distinguish precedent rules, the precedent
rules have no constraining effect, either on the outcomes of new
cases or on the content of the rules announced by new judges.
When the new court announces a “modified” rule, it is not
following precedent but acting as a lawmaking authority in its
own right.

The new court, not the precedent court, is the author

of the rule.
Beyond this, many of the observations we have already made
about analogical decisionmaking apply equally to the disanalogies used to distinguish precedents.

The possibilities for

factual distinction between any two cases, like the possibilities
for findings of factual similarity, are infinite.

Further, as in

the case of a fortiori decisionmaking, the factual descriptions
provided by precedent judges place no meaningful limit on judges’
ability to distinguish new cases because current judges are
likely to assume that facts not actually mentioned in precedent
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opinions were not present.51

The outcome of the prior case does

not in itself illuminate which dissimilarities are important.
Therefore, the practice of distinguishing is most plausibly and
appealingly understood as a process of ordinary reasoning that
refers to moral principles or rules to identify important
differences among cases, rather than a decisionmaking method in
which the outcome of one case bears directly on the outcome of
another.

So understood, findings of dissimilarity, like findings

or similarity, do not entail a form of “legal” reasoning that
differs from the reasoning used in any other field.
Summary: Why Purely Analogical Decisionmaking Does Not
Exist.

Analogical reasoning is supposed to act as a constraint

on judicial decisionmaking, either dictating parallel results a
fortiori, dictating parallel results in similar cases, or
determining when judges may avoid precedent rules.

We hope we

have shown that it does none of these things.
Analogical decisionmaking based on factual similarity
between cases is either intuitive or deductive.

If the process

of identifying important similarities is intuitive, the precedent
case does not constrain the outcome of the new case in any
predictable or even detectable way.

If the process is deductive,

the rules or principles that govern similarity, rather than the
outcome of the precedent case, determine the result of the new
case.
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A precedent case cannot determine the result of a new case a
fortiori because some fact about the new case can always be cited
as weighing in favor of a different result and therefore
dispelling the a fortiori effect of the precedent.
notion of weighing sets of facts is problematic.

Moreover, the

To “weigh” two

different sets of facts, a judge identify a common metric for
comparison.

If such a metric exists at all, its application to a

body of precedent that includes incorrect decisions will result
in legal chaos.
Finally, distinguishing precedent rules is an open-ended
process in which the precedent rules themselves have no
constraining effect.

Rather than applying modified precedent

rules, judges in new cases exercise rulemaking authority,
constrained only by such limits as there may be on findings of
dissimilarity.

Findings of dissimilarity, however, can only be

limited by independent principles or rules that establish the
importance of particular facts.

The prior decisions themselves

ultimately are inert.
There is one possible qualification to what we have just
said.

We noted in our discussion of constraint by similarity

that a court might base a determination of similarity, not on an
independent moral principle or rule, but on a “legal” principle
that explains precedent cases.

If so, precedent cases might

constrain current outcomes by restricting the content of the
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legal principle on which the analogy is based.

We take up, and

reject, this possibility in the next section.

Reasoning from Legal Principles
We have argued that analogical reasoning does not exist,
apart from supportin52g general rules.

To the extent that the

analogies are supported by moral principles, morally justified
rules, or serious precedent rules, analogical reasoning is not a
special form of reasoning known to lawyers, but an exercise in
ordinary moral, empirical, and deductive reasoning.

There

remains, however, one alternative possibility, which has played a
leading part in the mystification of legal reasoning: the
possibility of reasoning from legal principles.
The idea that judges decide cases by reasoning from legal
principles has a venerable history and a strong resonance for
most lawyers and judges.

According to this view of legal

reasoning, a judge presiding over a dispute surveys the body of
legal precedents, formulates a principle that explains them, then
applies the principle to determine the rights of the parties in
the pending case.53

Law students are taught to reason in this

way, judicial opinions follow this pattern, and traditional
academic commentary employs a similar method to explain the law
and propose reform.
The Nature of Legal Principles.
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The best known and most

rigorous account of the process of reasoning from legal
principles comes from Ronald Dworkin.54

Dworkin describes legal

principles as the morally best principles capable of explaining a
substantial proportion of past legal decisions.

More precisely,

two criteria govern the formulation of legal principles: legal
principles must satisfy a threshold requirement of “fit” with
existing legal materials, and they must come as close as they
can, given the requirement of fit, to being morally ideal.55
Legal principles do not dictate outcomes in the manner of
rules; rather, they are “starting points” for decisionmaking,56
which “weigh” in favor of outcomes.57

At the same time, legal

principles are authoritative in the sense that the combination of
legal principles applicable to any case determines the judge’s
decision.

Other legal materials do not directly govern judicial

decisionmaking, but serve only as data points for construction of
legal principles.58

Effectively, therefore, legal principles

make up the content of the common law.
For example: Heidi must decide the case of Roscoe, who is
planning to open a paintball arena a residential neighborhood.
Surrounding owners argue that a paintball arena will increase
traffic and noise and should be enjoined as a nuisance.

The

parties refer to a number of prior nuisance cases: in one line of
cases, courts enjoined defendants from keeping a bear, an ocelot,
and a crocodile, respectively, in residential neighborhoods,
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citing danger to the safety of homeowners.

In another line of

cases, courts declined to enjoin a tennis club, a bowling alley,
a golf course, and a rifle range.
enjoined.

An archery range, however, was

Courts have also permitted a day care center, a

halfway house serving non-violent offenders, and a carefully
managed sewage treatment plant to operate in residential
neighborhoods.

From these precedents, Heidi abduces a legal

principle: landowners in residential neighborhoods are at liberty
to pursue activities that pose no significant risk to human
safety or health.

If Roscoe can show that the safety risks of

paintball are minimal, and if no other principles are in play,
Heidi will then deny the injunction and enter a judgment for
Roscoe.
One use (or purported use) of legal principles is to derive
solutions to new cases from past decisions.

Heidi’s decision in

favor of Roscoe, for example, can be viewed as an extension of
the line of cases permitting non-dangerous recreational
activities in residential neighborhoods by means of a principle
that ties those cases together and explains their relation to
other cases.

Legal principles can also be used to avoid rules

announced in past cases.

Suppose, for example, that in the prior

case involving an archery range, the court announced a rule,
“sports involving mechanically enhanced projectiles are nuisances
per se in a residential neighborhood.”
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In the sport of

paintball, players use guns to shoot paint at one another;
therefore, the precedent rule, treated as a serious rule, calls
for an injunction.

In a regime governed by legal principles,

however, rules do not operate as serious rules, but only as
evidence of legal principles.
override announced rules.

It follows that legal principles

Heidi can conclude that the principle

that best supports both the pattern of past outcomes and the
precedent rule is the principle that owners are at liberty to
pursue activities that pose no significant risk to health or
safety.

This principle explains the outcome of the archery case

and is arguably consistent with the purposes of the nomechanically-enhanced-projectile rule; at the same time, it
permits a decision for Roscoe, contrary to the terms of the rule.
Descriptions of legal principles vary as to the sources from
which such principles are drawn and with which they must “fit.”
Some accounts suggest that, as far as the common law is
concerned, only the facts and outcomes of past decisions are
relevant; the current judge is free to disregard rules and other
statements found in past opinions.59

This description of legal

principles connects them to analogical reasoning: legal
principles are the generalizations drawn from past results, which
judges can then use to identify relevant similarities among
cases.
In other accounts, rules and principles set forth in prior
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opinions, as well as facts and outcomes, are pertinent to the
content of legal principles.60

But here a distinction must be

drawn: a judge reasoning from legal principles treats past
statements as data from which to derive a principle; disposition
of the case is then governed not by the past statements but by
the principle they are found to support.

If the judge treats

past statements as direct constraints on his or her decision, the
judge is not applying a legal principle in the Dworkinian sense,
but deducing an outcome from posited precedent rules.
Legal principles, therefore, are fundamentally different
from legal rules.

The difference is not a function of the form

of the prior judge’s statement but of the role it plays in the
current judge’s decision.

If Heidi decides for Roscoe because

prior judges have stated that activities that pose no significant
risk to human health or safety are permissible in residential
neighborhoods, she is treating past statements as rules.

If she

decides for Roscoe because she believes past judicial statements
about safety support a principle that activities that pose no
significant risk to human health or safety are permissible, she
is following the method that Dworkin recommends.
Another way to put this is that a judicial rule is a norm
posited by a prior judge.61

The precedent judge acts as

lawmaker, exercising authority by announcing a rule.62
principle is not posited, but organic.
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Due to the dimension of

fit, it changes as the body of legal decisions changes over
time.63

The lawmaker is the current judge, who defines and

applies a principle that appears consistent with the decisions
and statements of past judges.

Future judges, however, will

remake the principle as they decide the cases that come before
them against the background of precedent cases as those stand at
the time of their decisions.

Thus, legal principles are not

posited by past judges; nor are they posited by the current judge
who constructs them for the purpose of deciding a case.
Rules also differ from legal principles in that they
determine the results of future cases that fall within their
terms.

Legal principles, in contrast, are not determinative of

outcomes.

Instead, they are reasons for decision that have

“weight” when they come in conflict with other legal principles.
The outcome of any given case depends on the balance of
applicable principles.64

For example, the legal principle in

Roscoe’s case (landowners in residential neighborhoods are at
liberty to pursue activities that pose no significant risk to
human safety or health) might be restated as two principles: a
principle that owners should be allowed the maximum use of their
property and a competing principle that owners must not use their
property in ways that pose significant health or safety risks on
neighbors.

If the latter of which proves to be of greater

weight, Roscoe is enjoined.
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At the same time, legal principles are not moral principles;
they are principles internal to law.

The dimension of fit

requires that legal principles must conform to the pattern of
past decisions, even if, as a consequence, the principles that
result are morally flawed.65

Legal principles need only be the

morally best principles that pass the threshold of fit.
Thus, Heidi may believe that paintball has no redeeming
social value that justifies the burdens of traffic and noise it
imposes on surrounding owners.

More generally, she may believe

that the correct moral principle for nuisance cases holds that
landowners may not engage in activities that pose significant
burdens of any kind on surrounding owners unless those burdens
are justified by the importance of the activity as a service to
the community.

In Roscoe’s case, however, prior decisional

history appears to rule out Heidi’s ideal principle.

Recall that

in prior cases, courts enjoined several owners from keeping wild
animals and enjoined an owner from opening an archery range, but
permitted other owners to maintain a tennis club, a bowling
alley, a golf course, a rifle range, a day care center, a halfway
house, and sewage treatment plant.

A perfect fit with these

decision is not required: for example, Heidi probably can
disregard the rifle range case as a mistake.

But three of ten

other precedents permitted recreational uses that were likely to
increase traffic and noise.

Therefore the threshold of fit seems
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to require that Heidi modify her ideal principle to allow uses
that do not fill an important social need, unless those uses pose
a threat to health or safety.

In other words, given the

inevitable fact of erroneous outcomes in the past, legal
principles are the most morally attractive morally incorrect
principles that fit the background of prior decisions.66
A further observation, related to the last, is that the
process of formulating legal principles is not a process of
reflective equilibrium.67

The structure of reasoning is similar

- the judge refers to particular judgments and formulates a
principle to support them; but the effect is radically different.
Legal principles must be consistent with a certain (undefined)
percentage of the judgments with which the reasoner begins.
all past decisions can be rejected.

Not

In the case of reflective

equilibrium, the reasoner can reject any and all judgments that
cannot be explained by what the reasoner holds confidently to be
a morally correct principle.
A second, closely related difference between judicial
formulation of legal principles and the method of reflective
equilibrium is that the judgments from which the reasoner (the
current judge) draws a legal principle are not moral judgments,
but authoritative acts by past judges.

They may be morally

correct or incorrect, but this does not matter; until the
threshold of fit has been passed, the fact that past decisions
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were wrong does not alter their effect on the content of the
principle.

In contrast, the judgments from which a moral

principle is drawn in the process of reflective equilibrium are
moral judgments, whose effect on outcome of reasoning depends on
their ability to survive reflection.
As with analogical reasoning, much of the appeal of legal
principles lies in the compromise they appear to allow between
unconstrained natural reasoning and serious rules that preempt
reasoning.68

Judges reasoning from legal principles are

constrained by the limits that institutional history (in the form
of past decisions) places on the principles’ content.

At the

same time, judges need not set aside moral values or abstain from
exercising their powers of reason when deciding cases.

They must

formulate and apply the most morally attractive principles that
fit with institutional history, and in doing so they can discard
at least some past mistakes.
Another part of the allure of legal principles is the
promise of a body of law shaped by internal coherence.69

Legal

principles maintain consistency among past, present, and future
decisions and across doctrinal boundaries.

A regime of legal

principles, in which coherence provides a standard for
development of law, has the added advantage of providing an
answer (although not necessarily a unique answer) to every
dispute, which is grounded in preexisting law.70
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The right

outcome in any new case is the outcome that, in the judge’s view,
best fits what has come before.
Or so it may seem.

We do not accept the claims made for

this form of decisionmaking.

As a matter of logic, we do not

believe legal principles are viable as constraints on judicial
reasoning.

If they do constrain, we believe they are a vice, not

a virtue, of legal decisionmaking.
Faulty Logic.

Working from Dworkin’s description of legal

principles, we can demonstrate in two ways that legal principles
are incapable of constraining judicial decisions.

Our first

argument is based on the notion of weight: the effect of a legal
principle on the outcome of any dispute is a function of its
weight in competition with other principles.71

The process by

which a judge is to calculate a principle’s weight, however, is
mysterious.72
Recall that, by hypothesis, legal principles differ from
morally correct principles because they must be made to fit a
body of decisions that is sure to contain some mistakes.

It is

possible that in a given area of law, so few decisions will be
mistaken that the legal principle suggested by past cases will
correspond to a correct moral principle.

But it is equally

possible, and probably more likely, that the legal principle
suggested by past decisions in an area of law will not pass the
threshold of fit unless it conforms to a significant number of
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past errors.
incorrect.

The best legal principle will then be morally
Further, assuming that there are both morally correct

and morally incorrect legal principles immanent in existing legal
materials, it must be the case that morally incorrect legal
principles will sometimes outweigh morally correct legal
principles: otherwise, all outcomes would follow from morally
correct principles and past outcomes would have no practical
effect on present decisions.

Given these assumptions, the

question for the judge becomes, what weight should a morally
incorrect legal principle have in competition with other correct
and incorrect principles?
There is nothing in the past decisions themselves that can
determine the weight of the legal principle they support.

The

judge might count the number of decisions that support a
particular legal principle, but the number of supporting
decisions does not tell her what weight the erroneous legal
principle has as a reason for decision in the current case.

Nor

can a judge refer to correct moral principles to assign weight to
an incorrect legal principle, because correct moral principles
will always dictate that incorrect principles should have no
weight at all.

In other words, there is no possible standard for

determining the weight of incorrect legal principles: their
weight must be a matter of unregulated intuition or discretion.
Therefore, legal principles cannot control what the judge
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ultimately decides.73
Our second argument to show that legal principles cannot
constrain judicial decisionmaking is based on the requirement of
fit with past decisions.

An initial difficulty is that the

necessary degree of fit cannot be specified in a non-arbitrary
way.

We know only that a legal principle must fit well enough

with past decisions to meet the objective of coherence, and that
it must fit some number of mistaken decisions if it is to be
distinguished from natural reasoning.

Beyond this, nothing in

the idea of a legal principle tells where the threshold of fit
lies and how many recalcitrant decisions the judge can ignore.74
But suppose we assume that judges can interpret the
threshold of fit in a reasonably determinate way.

This brings us

to our main point, which is that the requirement of fit is not a
real constraint: a judge can always devise a legal principle that
fits perfectly with past cases and also applies a correct moral
principle to present and future cases.

To do this, the judge

simply states the applicable moral principle and adds an
exception describing past outcomes.75
For example, assume that the correct moral principle
governing land use in residential neighborhoods is that
landowners may not engage in activities that pose significant
burdens on surrounding owners unless those burdens are justified
by the activity’s importance as a service to the community.
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Heidi believes that, based on this principle, she should enjoin
Roscoe from opening his paintball arena; however, she also
believes that the correct moral principle is at odds with past
decisions allowing a tennis club, a bowling alley, and a golf
course to operate in residential neighborhoods (decisions X, Y,
and Z).

To escape this bind, she can formulate a legal

principle, “landowners may not engage in activities that impose
significant burdens on surrounding owners unless those burdens
are justified by the activity’s importance as a service to the
community; except that they may operate the specific tennis
clubs, bowling alleys, or golf courses permitted in past cases X,
Y, and Z.”

This principle supports all past decisions but favors

an injunction against Roscoe.

Given that the past cases are

past, and that X, Y, and Z can never recur, the principle also
favors morally correct outcomes in all future cases.

In its

prospective effect, Heidi’s legal principle is indistinguishable
from the correct moral principle.

In practice, therefore, the

“legal” component of the principle is inert.
If judicial maneuvering of this kind seems implausible,
recall that the only cases in which legal principles constrain
natural reasoning are cases in which the judge believes the
outcome indicated by the legal principle is morally wrong.
moral superiority of a principle that applies correct moral
principles with an exception for past mistakes may well
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The

counteract its ungainly ad hoc formulation.

In fact, if we take

Dworkin’s criteria for legal principles literally, it appears
that Heidi must formulate her legal principle this way, in order
to achieve the maximum of both fit and moral attractiveness.
We have addressed our arguments so far to Ronald Dworkin’s
account of legal principles, in which a judge constructs a legal
principle from the data of past decisions to resolve a current
dispute.

Suppose instead that we take a conventional view of

legal principles: legal principles are the decisional principles
generally agreed upon within the legal profession.76
a principle constrain judicial decisionmaking?

Could such

We do not think

so.
We note, first, that to count as legal principles,
conventional legal principles must operate as legal principles,
not as rules.

They must be organic rather than posited, changing

as the body of professional opinion changes.

Their content must

be governed at least in part by coherence with past decisions.
They must influence future decisions by exerting weight, rather
than determine future decisions by prescribing results.77
The weight of a conventional legal principle, as well as its
content, is established by professional agreement.

There are two

ways to conceive of legal principles as products of convention.
First, legal professionals might agree on the principles
themselves: legal principles, and their weights, are constituted
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by professional agreement.
quickly.

We can reject this understanding

If legal principles are posited by the profession - for

example, in judicial opinions or legal texts - they do not count
as legal principles, but as posited rules.

If, on the other

hand, they arise out of agreement alone, they are selfreferential.

Professional agreement cannot create a preexisting

principle, and if the principle does not predate professional
agreement, the profession cannot be agreeing upon the principle
but rather, must be generating it.

If the profession generates

the principle, it is, once again, a posited rule, not something
distinct.
Alternatively, legal professionals might agree, not directly
about the content of legal principles, but about how particular
cases should be decided.

In that case, legal principles might be

conceived of as the best principles that conform to
particularized professional judgments.

The main difficulty with

this account of legal principles is that it depends on the
unlikely event of broad professional consensus.

To the extent

that professionals disagree about outcomes, there are no legal
principles.

A further problem is that when professionals do

agree on particular outcomes, it is not at all clear that their
agreement on outcomes reflects an agreement on legal principles
and their comparative weights.

Consensus about outcomes might

just as well follow from agreement on an unstated moral rule.
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In

other words, professional judgment about outcomes might be
shaped, not by institutional history (in the manner of a legal
principle) but by moral principles, including principles that
give moral weight to past decisions.
Pernicious Effects.

We have argued that judges cannot

reason from legal principles: legal principles are logically
incapable of imposing constraint.

At this point, we shall

suspend logic and assume both that past decisions shape legal
principles and legal principles affect the outcome of current
decisions.

Our argument here is that legal principles, if in

fact they are effective, can seriously impair the quality of
decisionmaking.
Our basic argument is simple.

Legal principles incorporate

moral error into law without the compensating benefits of serious
rules.

We have already explained that legal principles are

imperfect from a moral point of view because they must conform to
past decisions, some of which will be moral mistakes.

As a

result, they are inferior to ideal natural reasoning, which
perfectly reflects moral ideals.78
Rules too are morally imperfect.

They are based on moral

principles, but to guide decisions, they must generalize in ways
that lead to morally mistaken outcomes in some cases.

They may

also fall short of moral standards due to obsolescence or faulty
design.

Rules, however, compensate in several ways for the moral
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mistakes they produce.

They settle moral controversy, preempt

errors by individual decisionmakers, provide coordination, and
make decisionmaking more efficient.79
Legal principles provide none of these benefits.

Principles

whose content is determined by a standard of coherence with past
decisions may yield answers to legal questions, but they will not
yield unique answers because more than one principle may satisfy
the requirement of coherence.

Further, even if we assume that

morally incorrect legal principles can have weight and that
judges will not circumvent the requirement of fit through
creative use of exceptions, judges have considerable freedom in
reasoning from legal principles.

To formulate and apply a legal

principle, a judge must draw tentative principles from past
cases, determine which among eligible principles is morally best,
and assign weight to competing principles.

The risk that judges

will err as they proceed through these steps is at least a great
as the risk of error in natural reasoning.

The process of

decisionmaking under legal principles is just as complex as
natural reasoning, if not more so. Because judges may vary in the
legal principles they extrapolate from precedents and the moral
values that guide them in selecting principles and assigning them
weight,80 legal principles cannot provide the benefits of
coordination and will thus lead to further moral costs beyond
their incorporation of past errors.
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Not only do legal principles fail to provide the benefits of
serious rules, they override rules.

According to some

descriptions at least, rules announced in prior opinions are
among the legal materials with which legal principles must be
made to fit.81

Once the threshold of fit has been passed,

however, rules can be discarded; and in any event precedent rules
do not prescribe results: they can only help to shape legal
principles.

In a regime of legal principles, therefore, there

can be no serious rules.
The Failure of Proposed Justifications for Legal Principles.
Various normative arguments have been made on behalf of legal
principles; in our view, none succeed.

One such argument is that

reasoning from legal principles promotes equality or “integrity.”
The requirement of fit with past decisions means that past and
present litigants who are similarly situated (as defined by the
legal principle itself) will be treated alike.82

More generally,

legal principles drawn from past decisions provide judges with a
comprehensive set of decisional standards that unite the body of
law and reflect a “coherent conception of justice and fairness”
applicable to all parties in all cases.83
We have already explained why we reject like treatment of
litigants over time as a moral ideal.84

Legal cases are never

identical, and past opinions offer limited factual descriptions
that can filter out important differences.
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More substantively,

aside from the effects of justified reliance, morally incorrect
decisions in the past do not justify morally incorrect decisions
in the present and future.

Equality is theory-dependent: it

requires, if anything, that any given moral principle be applied
equally to all.

A lapse in the past is a cause for regret but

not for additional moral wrongs.
For those who are convinced that equal treatment among
litigants is a moral good even when governing moral principles
are misapplied, we suggest that legal principles are not a
reliable source of consistency in judicial decisionmaking.

Given

the variability of legal principles among judges and the
changeability of legal principles over time, past and present
litigants may not in fact be treated alike.

Serious rules at

least guarantee like treatment of all cases that fall within the
classes defined by a rule; legal principles are too unstable to
guarantee a similar level of consistency.

And, as we have noted,

legal principles makes serious rules impossible.
A second, related claim on behalf of legal principles is
that they avoid retroactivity.85

Natural and rule-based models

of law allow judges to make retroactive decisions, in the manner
of legislatures.

Natural reasoning does not rely on predefined

standards of decision and legal rules apply only to the classes
of cases that fall within their terms; in any other case, the
judge must decide what is best, all things considered, or
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formulate a new rule and apply it to events that occurred before
the announcement of the rule.

Legal principles, in contrast,

“exist” prior to their application to particular cases, as the
morally best principles that explain the body of decisions to
date.

They are capable of resolving all possible disputes,

because coherence with the past supplies a decisional standard
for new cases.

It follows, according to this claim, that when

judges decide cases on the basis of legal principles, they are
enforcing preexisting rights of the parties.
This argument for legal principle fails on several grounds.
First, natural decisionmaking, including natural decisionmaking
in the interstices of legal rules, takes account of the moral
concerns that make retroactivity a problem.

Judges reasoning

naturally can and must consider the effects of their decisions on
justified expectations of the parties and other actors.86
Second, it is not so clear that legal principles preexist
particular decisions in a way that matters morally.

As we

explained in comparing legal principles with rules, legal
principles are indeterminate in several ways.87

Indeterminacy

means, in turn, that the prior “existence” of legal principles is
no guaranty against unfair surprise.
Moreover, as Ken Kress has shown, the content of legal
principles changes over time.88

Legal principles, at least as

defined by Dworkin, are the morally best principles that pass a
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threshold of fit with prior decisions.

Assuming that judges do

not simply combine correct moral principles with exceptions for
past cases, and assuming that the set of past decisions includes
some mistakes, the best available legal principle will always be
a principle that fits the minimum allowable number of past
decisions.

Beyond this threshold, judges will discard mistaken

precedents in order to formulate morally preferable principles.
Meanwhile, new decisions, are constantly entering the body of
law.

As this occurs, judges will discard more past mistakes, new

mistakes will need to be accounted for, and legal principles will
change accordingly.

Legal principles, in other words, are

organic rather than fixed, and it is impossible to predict with
confidence their content at any time.

As Kress demonstrates,

they may even change between the time of the disputed transaction
and the time the dispute is adjudicated, thus resulting in
retroactivity.

In other words, reasoning from legal principles

may be less rather than more capable of avoiding pernicious
retroactivity than natural reasoning on the rule model.
Summary: Why Legal Principles Do Not and Should Not Have a
Role in Judicial Decisionmaking.

For many lawyers, the idea of

legal principles seems to capture an important part of legal
reasoning.

As a matter of logic, however, legal principles

cannot operate in the way their proponents suggest, as a medium
by which past decisions constrain the outcome of natural
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reasoning in current cases.

The notion of weight is too elusive,

and the criterion of fit with prior decisions is too malleable,
to sustain the argument that legal principles guide judges in
reaching decisions.
Perhaps if judges took the requirement of fit very seriously
- legal principles must explain all prior decisions without
resort to awkward exceptions - past decisions would exert some
(vague) power over current outcomes.

The effect, however, would

be pernicious: legal principles would entrench past errors
without securing the benefits associated with legal rules.

In

any event, coherence would eventually break down under a strict
standard of fit.

Not surprisingly therefore, proponents of legal

principles do not support a standard of this kind.
Accordingly, we eliminate from our account of legal
reasoning the entire apparatus of legal principles.

To the

extent that analogical reasoning rests on similarities identified
by reference to legal principles, we also exclude analogical
reasoning from our account.

In the next chapter, we suggest that

the process of drawing analogies and searching past decisions for
evidence of principles may have a practical function for judges.
But legal principles, and analogies based on legal principles, do
not determine the outcomes of cases.

Judges who purport to

reason on this basis are either reasoning naturally under the
guise of legal principles or reasoning deductively from
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informally posited rules.
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at through a process and was not immediately apparent. It
seems better to say there is reasoning, but it is
imperfect.”
Levi, supra note 1, at 3. See also Roscoe Pound, Law Finding
Through Experience and Reason 45-65 (cautioning against confusion
of analogical reasoning with “reason”).
26. This is structurally similar to the form of analogical
reasoning described by Scott Brewer. According to Brewer, the
analogical reasoner abduces a potential rule of decision from the
common facts of the precedent case and the new case (the
“target”), tests the rule against a broader rationale, then, if
the rule proves satisfactory, deduces an outcome. See Brewer,
supra note 1, at 962-65. Brewer assumes, however, that the
reasoner is bound to apply a rule abduced from existing
precedents. In other words, the decisional rule generated by
Brewer’s reasoner is a legal principle of the kind we reject in
the next section of this chapter.
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In contrast, the judge in our description searches for a
morally sound rule that supports her intuition of similarity.
she cannot formulate a satisfactory rule, the intuition of
similarity is unsupported and will not justify a decision.

If

27. Brian Leiter finds support for judgments of this kind in
Heidegger. See Brian Leiter, Heidegger and the Theory of
Adjudication, 106 Yale L.J. 253, 259-61, 277-78 (1996) (criteria
of relevant similarity, on which analogical decisionmaking
depends, “can never be made fully explicit;” therefore judicial
decisionmaking resists theorization or critical evaluation and is
best understood as practical wisdom).
28.

See Chapter One, supra, text at note 3.

29. See Larry Alexander, Constrained By Precedent, 63 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 1, 29-30 (1989); Horty, supra note 1; see also Lamond,
supra note 1 (defending what appears to be a from of a fortiori
decisionmaking).
30. At this point, a fortiori decisionmaking may appear to
collapse into rule-bound decisionmaking: all bears are nuisances.
See Alexander, supra note 29, at 43. John Horty points out,
however, that an important difference remains, in that the later
court could find that an additional fact, present in the later
case but not in the precedent case, favors the opposite fact. In
the later case, for example, the cage may be stronger or the
neighborhood differently configured. See Horty, supra note 1, at
28-29.
31.

See Raz, supra note 1, at 187; Lamond, supra note 1, at 16.

32. See Horty, supra note 1, at 23-27 (using a set of equations
based on the “polarities” of different facts to explain a
fortiori reasoning); Lamond, supra note 1, at 15 (acknowledging
that, because “cases come before courts with all of their
multitudinous facts,” courts must determine the relevance of
certain facts). See also Burton, supra note 1, at 31-41
(discussing, somewhat mysteriously, the need for a “judgment of
importance).
33. See Lamond, supra note 1, at 16 (appearing to rely on the
precedent court’s explanation of why particular facts justified a
conclusion as establishing the relevance of those facts).
34. Horty argues that it is possible for precedents to have an a
fortiori effect in the absence of a metric for comparing the
weight of different facts. If a precedent case is decided for
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the plaintiff, and if all the facts that supported the plaintiff
in the precedent case are present in a later case, and all the
facts that support the defendant in the later case were present
in the precedent case; then the later case follows a fortiori
from the precedent case. Horty, supra note 22, at 23-24. This
seems correct, but the constraint provided by the precedent is
minimal. All that is needed to free the later court to decide as
it believes best is a single new fact in support of the
defendant.
Horty also gives the example of a case involving two
precedents. In the first precedent case, a certain plaintifffavoring fact (f1B) outweighed a certain defendant-favoring fact
(f1*). In the second precedent case, a different plaintifffavoring fact (f2B) was outweighed by a different defendantfavoring fact (f2*). If the later case involves the plaintifffavoring facts present in both of the precedent cases and also
the defendant-favoring fact that was outweighed in the first
precedent case (f1B, f2B, and f1*), the later case is governed a
fortiori by the precedent cases. Id. at 25. But again, a single
new fact is enough to dispel the a fortiori effect.
35.

See Alexander, supra note 29, at 34-37.

36. See Bortz v. Troth, 59 A.2d 93 (Pa. 1948) (holding a gas
station to be a nuisance per se).
37. Cf. Russell Hardin, Rational Choice, in II Encyclopedia of
Ethics 1062, 1063-64 (Lawrence C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker,
eds., New York; London: Garland Publishing 1992) (discussing
cardinal and ordinal utility measurement).
38.

See Lamond, supra note 1, at 2-4, 16-20.

39. See id. The notion of “ratio decedendi” is discusseded in
W.A.B. Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case and the Doctrine of
Binding Precedent, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 148, 160-63
(A.G. Guest, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press 1961).
40.

Lamond, supra note 1, at 2.

41. See Diehl v. Lockard, 385 A.2d 550 (1978)(holding a Pizza
Hut to be a nuisance per se).
42. Lamond does not make clear whether the “reason” for the
precedent outcome is the reason stated or implied by the
precedent court, or a reason constructed by the later court. He
says at one point that “What the precedent court decided [and
therefore what the later court must accept] was that in the
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context of [the precedent facts, certain facts] justified the
conclusion C.” Id. at 16. At another point he says that “the
later court... must consider how strong the reason provided by
[the facts entailed by the ratio of the precedent case] for C
really is and whether it is defeated by any reason[s] based on
[different facts of the later case]. Id. At yet another point,
he states that “the ratio sets out the factors that ground the
reason(s) in favor of the result: the later court must determine
the strength of th reason in favor of the result in the precedent
on the basis of those factors.” Id. at 18.
43. See, e.g., William N. Dember & Joel S. Warm, The Psychology
of Perception 113, 116-17 (2d ed., New York: Holt 1979); Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decison
Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263, 277 (1979); Anne Treisman,
Properties, Parts, and Objects, in II Handbook of Perception and
Human Performance 35-4 (Kenneth R. Boff, Lloyd Kaufman, & James
P. Thomas, eds., New York; Chichester; Brisbane; Toronto;
Singapore: John Wiley & Sons 1986).
44. See, e.g., Raz, supra note 1, at 185-87; Lamond, supra note
1, at 16-17. See also Robert S. Summers, Precedent in the United
States (New York), in Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative
Study 355, 390-92 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers,
eds.)(Dartmouth: Ashgate 1997) (describing the practice of
distinguishing as “arguing either that the material facts were
different or that the substantive rationale for the ruling does
not apply to the facts of the case under consideration).
45.

See Lamond, supra note 1, at 17.

46. We agree with Lamond on this point. See id. at 17-18, 1920; see also Levi, supra note 1, at 3 (“rules are discovered in
the process of determining similarities and differences) . For
the common view that distinguishing creates exceptions to rules,
see, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 66-68; Raz, supra note 1,
183-89; A.W.B. Simpson, The Ratio Decedendi of Case and the
Doctrine of Binding Precedent, in Osford Essays in Jurisprudence
158-59 (A.G. Guest, ed., London: Oxford University Press 1961);
Summers, supra note 44, at 391.
47.

See Raz, supra note 1, at 1886-87.

48. Id. Raz assumes that any fact that might not have been
present in the precedent case - that is, any fact not mentioned
in the precedent opinion - can be a ground of distinction. If no
mention was made of fact f in the precedent opinion, the court in
the new case can assume that f is a new fact, and can announce a
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modified rule “if A, B, C, and not F, then X.”
49.

Id. at 187.

Raz at 187.

50. Lamond, in developing his “reason-based” account of
precedent, suggests that a later court’s choice of distinguishing
facts is limited by a requirement that “if the difference
provides an argument of the same kind as a fact that has already
been rejected [as a ground of distinction by a precedent court],
then the argument must be a compelling one.” Lamond, supra note
1, at 21. He adds however, that when a court distinguishes on
the basis of a fact that “is not of the same kind,” this limit
does not apply. Id.; see Simpson, supra note 46, at 174-75
(maintaining that not all factual distinctions suffice to
distinguish precedents, but only those that “justify” refusal to
follow the precedent).
51.

See note 47 and accompanying text, supra.

52. See Pound, An Introduction to Legal Philosophy, supra note
3, at 56; Pound, Survey of the Conference Problems, supra note 3,
at 328-31; Hart & Sacks, supra note 3, lxxix-lxxx, 545-96. Pound
also embraced the idea that judges should acts as “social
engineers.” See Pound, supra note 25, at 42-43; Pound, An
Introduction to Legal Philosophy, supra, at 47.
53. Zenon Bankowski, Neil MacCormick, and Geoffrey Marshall
aptly refer to this as a “determinative” theory of precedent.
Zenon Bankowski, D. Neil MacCormick, & Geoffrey Marshall,
Precedent in the United Kingdom, in Interpreting Precedents, in
Interpreting Precedents, supra note 44, at 315, 332. They
explain that a theory of this kind views law as
“Grounded in principles partly emergent from practice and
custom, partly constructed our of moral or ideological
elements that bring together practice and contemporary
values in a coherent order... Legal rules and judicial
rulings on points of law are then to be understood as
‘determinations’ (in the Thomist sense) of background
principles - neither deductions from them nor arbitrarily
discretionary decisions about them, but partly discretionary
decisions as to the best way of making the law determinate
for a given (type of) case... Precedent is authoritative
because each decision is a determination of law, but no
decision is absolutely defeasible.”
Id.
54. See Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 3, at 230-32, 254-58;
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 3, at 22-31, 115-18.
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55. See Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 3, at 228-32, 240-50,
254-58; Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 3, at 11518.
56. Pound, Survey of the Conference Problems, supra note 3, at
331.
57. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 3, at 26-27
(“Principles have a dimension that rules do not - the dimension
of weight”).
58.

See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 3, at 37.

59. Dworkin can be read in this way. He states, for example,
that “[f]itting what judges did is more important than fitting
what they said;” that “an interpretation [of precedent] need not
be consistent with past judicial attitudes or opinions, with how
past judges saw what they were doing, in order to count as an
eligible interpretation of what they in fact did;” and that the
ideal judge assigns “only an initial or prima facie place in his
scheme of justification” to rationales offered by prior judges.
Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 3, at 284; Dworkin Taking
Rights Seriously, supra note 3, at 118. He adds, however, that
fit with judicial opinions is “one desideratum that might be
outweighed by others.” Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 3, at
285. Cf. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 3, at 110115 (referring to the “enactment force” and gravitational force”
of precedents).
60. See Hart and Sacks, supra note 3, at 369; Pound, supra note
3, at 330-31 (indicating that principles are formulated gradually
as series of judges explain their reasoning y in opinions);
Stephen R. Perry, Two Models of Legal Principles, 82 Iowa L. Rev.
787, 807-08 1997)(understanding Dworkinian “fit” to refer to fit
with rules as well as decisions).
61.

See Chapter Two, supra, text at note 52.

62.

See Chapter Two, supra, text at notes 29-32.

63.

See Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 3, at 254-58.

64.

See note 57 and accompanying text, supra.

65. See Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 3, at 230-31, 255;
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 3, at 116-17.
66. See Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Rule of Rules:
Morality, Rules, and the Dilemmas of Law 147 (Durham; London:
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Duke University Press 2001); Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public
Domain 296 (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University
Press 1996; Larry Alexander, Precedent, in A Companion to
Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 503, 509 (Dennis Patterson,
ed., Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers 1996).
67.

See note 19, supra.

68.

See Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 3, at 254-58.

69. See Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 3, at 225, 228-32
(“The adjudicative principle of integrity instructs judges to
identify legal rights and duties, so far as possible, on the
assumption that they were all created by a single author – the
community personified – expressing a coherent conception of
justice and fairness.”); Kenneth J. Kress, Legal Reasoning and
Coherence Theories: Dworkin’s Rights Thesis, Retroactivity, and
the Linear Order of Decisions, 72 California Law Review 369, 370
(1984) (associating Dworkin with coherence theory); Barbara Baum
Levenbook, The Meaning of a Precedent, 6 Legal Theory 185, 233-34
(2000) (interpreting Dworkin’s theory of precedent as a coherence
theory).
70. See Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 3, at 258; Dworkin,
Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 3, at 81-84 (elaborating the
“rights thesis”). See also Hart & Sacks, supra note 3, at 369
(referring to the common law as “a process of settlement which
tries to relate the grounds of present determination in some
reasoned fashion to previously established principles and
policies and rules and standards).`
71.

See note 57 and accompanying text, supra.

72. The following paragraphs track the argument set out in
Alexander & Kress, supra note 69, at 301-06.
73. For an effort to systematize the process of weighing
principles, see S.L. Hurley, Coherence, Hypothetical Cases, and
Precedent, 10 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 221 (1990)
(suggesting that settled cases, actual and hypothetical, provide
guidance about the relative weight of principles in particular
factual settings).
74. See Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 3, at 255 (“different
judges will set [the threshold of fit] differently”).
75. See Alexander & Kress, supra note 69, at 304-06. Thus, if
PC is the correct moral principle, and PL is the best legal
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principle in terms of fit and moral attractiveness, and there are
N incorrect past cases, CN, then PL is PC - CN. Id.
76. See Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 Stan. L.
Rev. 739, 744-50 (1982).
77.

See text at notes 55-58, 61-63, supra.

78.

See text at note 65, supra.

79.

See Chapter Two, supra, text at notes 31-39.

80.

See Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 3, at 255-57.

81.

See note 60 and accompanying text, supra.

82. See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 3, at 11215; Michael S. Moore, Legal Principles Revisited, 82 Iowa L. Rev.
867, 872-89 (1997).
83. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 3, at 225. This is the
ideal Dworkin refers to as “integrity” in law. Id. For a
detailed refutation of Dworkin’s claim that reasoning from legal
principles leads to “integrity,” see Larry Alexander & Ken Kress,
Against Legal Principles, in Law and Interpretation: Essays in
Legal Philosophy 279 of Dworkin’s argument from “integrity,” see
Alexander & Kress, supra note 82, at 310-26 (Andrei Marmor, ed.,
Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995)..
84.

See Chapter Two, supra, text at notes 21-23.

85. See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 3, at 30,
85-86, 110-15, 335-38.
86.

See Chapter Two, supra, text at notes 17-19.

87.

See text at notes 71-74, supra.

88. See Kress, supra note 69, at 377-88; Alexander & Kress,
supra note 83, at 296-97.
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Chapter Four: Common Law Practice

In our analysis of the common law, we have taken argued that
judges resolving legal disputes reason in the ways that all
decisionmakers reason.

They reason naturally, drawing moral and

empirical conclusions through induction and the method of
reflective equilibrium, and they reason deductively from
authoritative rules.

Natural reasoning is unconstrained by law;

deductive reasoning is constrained by legal rules that preempt
natural reasoning.

Other methods of decisionmaking popularly

attributed to judges, including analogical reasoning from case to
case and reasoning from legal principles, are illusory.

Judges

may appear to do these things, but analogies and legal principles
impose no actual constraint on judicial reasoning.

The outcome

of purportedly analogical processes rests in fact on natural or
deductive reasoning.
We have also suggested that the common law will be most
effective, both in correctly resolving particular disputes and in
settling future controversies, if current judges treat rules
established by prior judges as binding in a preemptive sense.
This model of judicial decisionmaking, which we have called the
rule model, entails that judges have rulemaking authority.

In

Chapter Two, we addressed some of the theoretical questions that
arise when judges act as rulemakers, including the scope of their
1

rulemaking authority, preconditions for establishment of binding
precedent rules, and overruling of precedent rules.1

In the

present chapter, we consider some practical objections to the
rule model, both as a prescription for judicial decisionmaking
and as a description of judicial practice.
The most significant difficulty facing the rule model as a
prescription for decisionmaking is that judges may not be good
rulemakers.

Our argument for the superiority of the rule model

of judicial decisionmaking over unconstrained natural reasoning
depends on the quality of judicial rules.

Deduction from

precedent rules can improve on natural reasoning only if rules
prevent more error by preempting faulty reasoning, coordinating
conduct, and simplifying decisionmaking, than they cause by
prescribing the wrong result in particular cases.
Precedent rules can be faulty in several ways.

Most

obviously, rules may be substantively misconceived: they may
serve inappropriate ends, or the means they select may be inapt.
Alternatively, rules may be formally defective.

Rules may be so

blunt that errors of overinclusiveness exceed the errors that
would result from unconstrained reasoning and lack of
coordination.

Overinclusiveness is an unavoidable byproduct of

the qualities of generality and determinateness that make rules
effective; at some point, however, it goes too far.2

Precedent

rules may also be overly complex: if rules are too confusing,
2

judges and actors may err so frequently in applying them that
actual outcomes will not be superior to the outcomes of natural
reasoning.3

Another possibility is that rules may be too vague

and indeterminate to preempt natural reasoning, or may generate
interpretive controversies that are just as costly as the moral
controversies the rules were designed to settle.4
Whether any given judicial rule meets the standard of net
error reduction is, ultimately, an empirical question.

Certain

features of the environment in which judges announce rules,
however, give cause for concern about the quality of judicial
rules.

Under the rule model of judicial decisionmaking, judges

are not only rulemakers but also adjudicators.

For reasons we

outline below, the demands and distractions of adjudication
create a special risk of suboptimal rules.
Our argument for the rule model of judicial decisionmaking
can also be challenged on descriptive grounds: judges and lawyers
behave in ways that appear to contradict both the rule model of
decisionmaking and our more general conclusion that judicial
reasoning consists of nothing more than ordinary moral,
inductive, and deductive reasoning.

The rule model assumes that

judicial decisions are constrained only by posited rules; yet
judges claim to be guided by factual analogies to prior cases,
and lawyers regularly present analogies to judges as a source of
persuasion.5

The rule model assumes that judges have plenary
3

authority to make rules; yet, to the extent judges announce rules
at all, they typically confine themselves to narrow rules
tailored to the dispute before them.6

When precedent judges do

issue rules that go beyond the needs of adjudication, future
judges may disregard the rules as dicta.7

The rule model permits

overruling but does not recognize the practice of distinguishing
rules; in contrast, judges typically are reluctant to overrule
precedents but frequently claim to distinguish precedent rules.8
In the sections that follow, we raise the possibility that
various conventions traditionally associated with the common law
may help to counteract the disadvantages judges face as
rulemakers.

The conventions we consider do not ensure that

judges will adopt sound precedent rules, but they serve,
indirectly, to neutralize some predictable sources of error.

If

in fact conventional practices can improve the quality of
judicial rules, they place the rule model on a sounder practical
footing.

Further, the possibility that conventional practices

assist judges in designing sound rules helps to explain the
descriptive gaps between the rule model and actual judicial
behavior.

Practices that appear to contradict the rule model of

decisionmaking may have developed in response to the special
problems that arise when a single authority must both resolve a
particular dispute and also announce rules for a broader class of
future cases.
4

The picture of common law in action we present in this
chapter is far from ideal.

The practices we describe are not

direct, rational responses to the deficiencies of judicial
rulemaking, but rather are customary practices that counteract
those deficiencies in a rough and indirect way.

Because they

depend on professional custom, they are also potentially
unstable.

Yet the capacity of these practices to improve the

quality of judicial rules may explain why seemingly illogical
methods of decision and argumentation occupy a central place in
legal training and convention and also why the common law appears
to have evolved more sensibly over time than its circumstances
might predict.

Judges as Rulemakers
The rule model of the common law, in which precedent rules
are binding on later judges, is defensible only if precedent
rules prevent more error than they cause.

Judicial rules need

not perfectly translate moral principles into concrete
prescriptions, but they must be sufficiently well designed that
judges will do a better job of implementing moral principles by
following precedent rules than by reasoning without constraint.9
All rules - judicial or legislative - must meet this standard to
be justified as rules.

Judges, however, must combine the task of

rulemaking with the task of adjudication.
5

As a result, they face

special difficulties in designing rules that will bring about a
net reduction in error.
Inattention.

The first impediment to sound judicial

rulemaking is that judges tend to treat rulemaking as incidental
to adjudication.

For much of the history of English and American

common law, judges were reluctant to acknowledge their role as
lawmakers.

Creating law was the province of legislatures; the

role of judges was to resolve disputes according to previously
established law.10

In the absence of positive (legislated) law,

judicial decisions were governed by the common law, but the
common law was viewed as an independent body of norms located in
custom and “reason” rather than judicial opinions.11
judges were both

Because

learned in both legal custom and experienced in

the application of reason, their statements and decisions served
as evidence of law.

But they had no personal authority to make

law by announcing rules: they merely discovered and applied the
law.12
This view of the matter did not deter early courts from
developing a comprehensive body of law, but it prevented them
from acknowledging lawmaking as an equal part of their work.13
Modern judges, recognizing that their opinions affect conduct,
are quicker to admit that they can and do create law, and some
are quite explicit about announcing rules to govern future
cases.14

Yet for most courts, rulemaking continues to be a
6

secondary concern: the immediate need is to resolve a dispute.
As a result, judges are likely to announce rules more
casually than legislatures, with less attention to the full range
of the rules’ consequences.

Heidi, drafting an opinion in the

case of Edward’s bear, might state that “wild animals in
residential neighborhoods are nuisances per se;” therefore, the
bear must go.

Because her attention is focused on explaining why

she has decided against Edward, she may not pause to consider the
breadth of the rule, which by its terms bans not only bears but
also field mice and other odd but harmless pets.
Of course, Heidi’s statement may not in fact amount to a
rule.

As we understand the nature of authoritative rules, if

Heidi did not intend to announce a rule, no precedent rule
exists.15

In that case, no harm is done.

Yet it is also

possible that Heidi meant to state a rule justifying her decision
but formulated the rule in haste without thinking systematically
about future cases.

If so, the result is an authoritative, but

suboptimal, rule.
This is not to suggest that legislatures are impeccable
rulemakers.

For a variety of reasons, they too are capable of

enacting poor rules.

Legislatures, however, are at least more

likely to view future governance as a central part of their
project.
Cognitive Bias.

A second difficulty is that even when
7

judges turn their full attention to rulemaking, the facts of the
dispute before them may distort their reasoning about rules.

In

the developing field of behavioral decision theory, cognitive
psychologists have demonstrated that human decisionmakers rely on
a variety of “heuristics” - cognitive shortcuts - to reach
empirical conclusions.16

These heuristics are useful because

they allow people to form judgments with confidence under
conditions of complexity and uncertainty.

Yet because cognitive

heuristics replace full unbiased reasoning with simpler indirect
decisional strategies, they can also lead the reasoner into
error.17
Judges, like all human reasoners, are subject to errors of
this kind.

Cognitive heuristics can affect the accuracy of

judicial factfinding.

For example, well-documented biases can

lead judges (and juries) to err in calculating probabilities,18
determining causation and responsibility,19 judging the
foreseeability of past events,20 fixing damage awards,21
evaluating settlements,22 estimating the chance of reversal on
appeal,23 and assessing the merits of appeals.24
More important for our purposes, cognitive biases can affect
the design of judicial rules.

When the facts of a particular

dispute are prominent in a rulemaker’s mind, certain certain
heuristics are especially likely to come into play and to cause
the rulemaker to miscalculate the future effects of rules.
8

Accordingly, as Frederick Schauer has observed, there is reason
to doubt the common assumption that judicial rules benefit from
the concrete factual settings in which judges work.25

Concrete

facts may give judges a sense of rules in action, but they also
can distort judicial analysis of the consequences of rules across
the range of cases to which they apply.
The cognitive heuristic that bears most directly on the
rulemaking in the context of adjudication is “availability.”26
In judging the frequency or probability of events, decisionmakers
tend to assume that the events that come most easily to mind are
also the most likely to occur.

This assumption can work fairly

well as a time-saving rule of thumb, but it can also lead the
reasoner to overlook statistical probabilities.
When a judge formulates a rule for future cases, the facts
of the case currently pending are easy to recall, while other
potential applications of the rule are distant and possibly
unknown to the judge.

As a result, the current case may appear

more representative than it is of the class of cases covered by
the rule, and the court may announce a faulty rule.

For example:

Heidi is considering the case of Martha, whose mean-tempered pit
bull recently attacked a neighbor.

With Martha’s pit bull in

mind, Heidi formulates a rule, “pit bulls in residential
neighborhoods are nuisances per se.”
not be typical.

Martha’s dog, however, may

If, in fact, most pit bulls are docile, this
9

rule may cause more errors that it prevents.
Another heuristic likely to affect judges in their dual
capacity as rulemakers and adjudicators is “affect.”27
Particular images may evoke positive or negative emotions in
reasoners, based on the reasoner’s experience.

As a cognitive

heuristic, affect manifests itself in a number of ways.

The most

pertinent for our purposes is that decisionmakers give more
weight to information that translates easily into emotionally
charged images than to information that does not produce a ready
affective response.

Thus, people take risks more seriously when

the risk is presented as a frequency (1 in 10) than when it is
presented as a probability (10%).

The reason for this,

presumably, is that frequency information refers to instances and
is therefore more likely to raise specific images in the
decisionmakers’s mind.

When risk information is presented in

narrative form, the response is stronger still.28
Like the availability heuristic, the affect heuristic
suggests that in formulating rules, judges may give greater
weight to the facts of the cases they are currently adjudicating
than to other cases that might fall within the terms of the rule.
The case at hand provides a ready-made set of images, often
presented in a manner calculated to invoke the adjudicator’s
emotions.

As a result, it may command the judge’s attention in a

way that statistical information about the class of cases
10

governed by the rule does not.

The picture of Martha’s pit bull

mauling a child may lead Heidi to adopt the wrong nuisance rule.
Legislators can be influenced by affect and availability as well,
as when they act in response to events that have engaged public
emotions.

In the case of judges, however, vivid images that are

likely to provoke an affective response are a regular feature of
the rulemaking environment.
Another possibly relevant heuristic is “anchoring.”29

In

assessing value or probability, decisionmakers may be influenced
by particular numbers or instances that have been brought to
their attention, even if those numbers or instances are not
typical.

For example: Heidi is considering whether to announce a

rule that pits bulls in residential neighborhoods are nuisances
per se.

A pertinent question is what percentage of pit bulls are

dangerously aggressive.

The plaintiffs in Martha’s case have

shown that Martha owns four pet pit bulls, two of which have
attacked children or dogs in the neighborhood (50%).

Heidi

knows that Martha trained her dogs to act as watch dogs and that
she should, accordingly, adjust her estimate of the general
aggressiveness of pit bulls downward from 50%.

Yet, in the

absence of further evidence (which neither party has much reason
to present), the anchoring heuristic suggests that Heidi will not
adjust sufficiently from the initial figure suggested by the
facts.
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There are other possibilities.

Research suggests that

decisionmakers handle statistical calculations more accurately
when they understand that they are assessing a series of cases
(how often do pit bulls bite?) than when they focus on a single
event (how likely was it that Martha’s pit bull would bite?).30
Perceptions may be distorted by a sense of contrast when
decisonmakers begin with a single observation (compared to
Martha’s pit bull, airedales may appear safer than they are).31
Decisionmakers who observe the actions of others, as judges do in
deciding cases, tend to attribute causal responsibility to
personal traits of the actor rather than background conditions
because the actor is more salient (a pit bull may appear
aggressive when in fact it is suffering from indigestion).32
Adjudication may have some positive effects on judicial
cognition as well.

Affect and examples appear to facilitate and

clarify decisionmaking in some situations.33

Focusing on a

specific set of facts may also lead judges to announce narrower
rules, which, while not necessarily optimal, will at least cause
less damage if they turn out to have been misconceived.34
Overall, however, the special salience of a pending dispute in
the mind of the judge seems likely to interfere with, rather than
enhance, the reasoning needed to design sound rules for future
cases.35
Overruling Problems.

The rule model of judicial
12

decisionmaking assumes that judges have authority not only to
make precedent rules but also to overrule them.36

At the same

time, the rule model does not and cannot distinguish between
overruling precedent rules and modifying or “distinguishing”
them.37

When a judge makes an exception to a rule to accommodate

a particular case, the judge is effectively eliminating the
precedent rule and announcing a new rule in its place.
As we explained in Chapter Two, judges ideally should
overrule precedent rules only when they are unjustified or
suboptimal as rules.

More precisely, judges should overrule

either when, due to obsolescence or poor design, a precedent rule
is likely to cause more erroneous results than it prevents over
the range of cases to which it applies, or when an alternative
rule would prevent more error or cause less error than the
precedent rule, and the likely benefits from error reduction
exceed the costs of the disruption likely to follow from
overruling the precedent.

At the same time, judges must bear in

mind that rules can be both justified and optimal as rules likely to reduce the sum of error over the range of their
application and preferable to any alternative - and yet prescribe
the wrong result in certain cases.

When a generally sound rule

appears to require an erroneous result, courts should not
overrule; they should treat the rule as a serious rule and follow
it without second-guessing what it prescribes.38
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As Schauer points out, judges may not succeed in overruling
precedent rules when and only when they should.39
the overruling standard itself.

One problem is

The rule model requires that, as

adjudicators, judges must follow precedent rules without regard
to the moral justification of the results those rules prescribe
in particular cases.

As makers and abrogators of rules, however,

judges can and should evaluate the overall moral justification of
rules before determining whether to retain them or to overrule
them.

This is a fine line for judges to walk.

If they fail to

make the distinction between erroneous outcomes and unjustified
or suboptimal rules, they may either upset settlements by
overruling sound rules to accommodate the supposed “equities” of
particular cases or entrench error by retaining defective rules.
The first problem - precipitous overruling - is aggravated
by the same cognitive heuristics that affect the design of
precedent rules, particularly the tendency to assume that readily
recalled facts or affectively charged images are representative
of the larger classes to which they belong.40

For example: Heidi

is considering the case of Sally, who keeps a well-trained,
amiable pit pull in her home.

In a previous nuisance case, a

judge announced the rule that “pit bulls in residential
neighborhoods are nuisances per se.”

Assume this rule is sound:

a rule excluding all pit bulls will produce more correct
decisions overall, and greater coordination benefits, than case14

by-case prediction of the probable behavior of particular pit
bulls.

When Heidi assesses this rule, however, the picture most

likely to come to mind is Sally’s well-mannered dog.
Particularly if the image of Sally and her pet evokes a positive
emotional response, the facts of the case are likely to have a
greater effect on Heidi’s deliberations than more abstract
information such as the statistical likelihood of pit bull
attacks and the coordination value of an unqualified no-pit-bull
rule.41

As a result, Heidi may be tempted to overrule the

precedent rule or modify it to allow owners of well-trained pit
bulls to keep their pets.

If the rule in its existing form is

the best rule for future pit bull disputes, this will be an
error: cognitive bias triggered by the adjudicatory setting will
have led Heidi to mistake a single regrettable outcome for lack
of overall justification for the rule.
As Schauer has noted, the second problem - failure to
overrule rules that are suboptimal or unjustified as rules - is
exacerbated by case selection effects.42

Judges address

precedent rules only when the rules are challenged by parties to
a dispute.

When the law governing a dispute is clear, however,

parties are likely to settle rather than bring their case to
court.43

It follows that judges may not often preside over cases

that involve core applications of a precedent rule.

Trials and

appeals become more likely when the rule’s application to
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particular facts is indeterminate.44

In cases of indeterminacy,

however, the judge can avoid allegedly infelicitous applications
of the rule by interpreting the rule narrowly so as to avoid
those applications, leaving the rule as so interpreted full in
effect.

Thus, judges may have few opportunities to assess the

everyday application of rules that are obsolete or misconceived.
A particularly harsh application may give the party opposing the
rule hope for an exception, but, as we have noted, a harsh
application does not necessarily indicate that the rule itself is
unsound.
Summary: Why Judges Are Poor Rulemakers.

The rule model of

judicial decisionmaking casts judges as both rulemakers and
adjudicators.

The dual role that judges perform in the legal

process is likely to affect the quality of judicial rules in
several ways.

The demands of adjudication, together with

traditions and political pressures that relegate rulemaking to a
secondary position, can lead judges to pay less attention than
they should to the potential consequences of their rules.
Cognitive heuristics, triggered by attention to particular facts,
can lead to miscalculation or disregard of the consequences of
rules.

Adjudication may also have adverse effects on judicial

oversight of precedent rules.
This is not to say that legislation is clearly superior to
common law as a source of settlement.
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Moral and empirical

deliberation by elected representatives is notoriously subject to
interest group politics and collective action problems, in
addition to cognitive biases and ordinary reasoning errors.45

We

are not equipped to undertake a full comparison of judicial and
legislative rulemaking; we note only that there is reason to
believe Schauer is correct in his observation that the need to
resolve a particular dispute hinders rather than helps judges in
producing sound precedent rules.

“Cases make bad rules.”46

Correctives to Judicial Rulemaking
Because judges announce rules in the course of resolving
particular disputes, they face impediments in designing sound
rules.

The risk of poor quality rules challenges the key

assumption of the rule model of judicial decisionmaking - the
assumption that following precedent rules will reduce the sum of
error.

The prospects for effective common law, however, may not

be as bleak as our analysis so far suggests.

In the sections

that follow, we suggest that some aspects of traditional commonlaw decisionmaking - practices and norms that we find difficult
to explain on any other ground - may work to improve the quality
of judicial rules.

We make this suggestion cautiously: the

practices we have in mind do not address the problems of judicial
rulemaking directly, and the correctives they provide are partial
at best.
17

The Method of Analogy.

We have argued that so-called

analogical reasoning does not contribute in a meaningful way to
judicial decisionmaking.47

The outcome of one case, without

more, carries no logical implications for the outcome of another
case.

Nor do past decisions constrain decisionmaking through the

device of “legal principles.”48

Our analysis of the notion of

legal principles (in its best-known and most attractive form)
suggests that past decisions do not generate legal principles,
and that if they could, legal principles would in any event have
no real impact on current decisions.

Further, if past decisions

could constrain the content of legal principles, and legal
principles could constrain the outcome of current cases, they
would do so only at the cost of entrenching error.

If we are

correct that analogical reasoning and reasoning from legal
principles are spurious constraints, it follows that the only
viable forms of legal reasoning are natural moral and empirical
reasoning and deduction from rules.
The analogical methods practiced by judges and lawyers may
nevertheless have a positive influence on legal rules.

The most

serious impediment to sound judicial rulemaking is the
possibility that a particular set of facts will have inordinate
influence on the judge’s deliberations about rules.49

Reacting

to evidence that Martha’s pit bull recently attacked a child,
Heidi may respond too quickly with a rule: “pit bulls in
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residential neighborhoods are nuisances per se.”
Seeking analogies in prior cases widens the judge’s
perspective by bringing alternative sets of fact to mind.
in turn reduces the risk of bias in rulemaking.

This

If the judge

proceeds to formulate a rule, exposure to additional facts makes
it less likely that the judge will assume the pending case is
representative of the larger class of cases covered by the
rule.50
Thus: in the case of Martha’s pit bull, Heidi, aided by
lawyers, will pause to review past nuisance cases involving dogs.
Assume she finds two cases in which courts allowed owners to keep
docile pit bulls, one in which a court ordered an owner to give
up a German shepherd that bit a landscaper, and another in which
the court allowed an owner to keep a very large sheepdog with no
history of aggressive behavior.

After consulting these cases,

Heidi may adjust her position and conclude that breeds are not
the most accurate criteria for judging when dogs are nuisances.
She may choose instead to issue a narrower rule (“attack-trained
pit bulls are nuisances”), a different rule (“dogs that have
previously engaged in aggressive behavior are nuisances”), or no
rule at all.
The benefits of analogical methodology are indirect.
Analogies to past decisions do not constrain the content of
judicial rules, any more than they constrain the outcome of
19

adjudication.

Instead, the process of searching for analogies

and comparing cases dilutes the impact of the pending dispute and
places the judges in a better position to seek reflective
equilibrium before announcing a rule.

After scanning an array of

factual settings, the judge is in a better position to test the
application of possible rules.

Actual evidence in the pending

case may be more vivid than descriptions of facts in past
opinions, but the images it presents are no longer unopposed.
Ideally, the notion of analogy would not be necessary.
Judges would test potential rules against examples drawn from
past cases and from other legal and extra-legal sources as well
in the course of natural reasoning about rules.51

Analogy enters

in because, in practice, time pressure and preoccupation with the
task of adjudication are likely to cut the process of
deliberation short.

The widely accepted belief that analogies

can and should guide judicial decisionmaking leads judges to
study a broader array of factual possibilities than they
otherwise likely would.
To some extent, the rule model of decisionmaking itself may
enlarge the perspective of judges.

Judges operating under the

rule model will come into contact with past decisions as they
search for precedent rules.

Analogical methods, however, are

likely to be more effective because they require the judge to
engage with the facts of prior cases, make comparisons, and
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formulate rules that explain the importance or unimportance of
common facts.

Analogical techniques are also broader in scope.

All cases are potentially “governed” by analogy, while precedent
rules cover only those cases that fall within their stated terms.
Accordingly, the search for analogies continues even if the court
is satisfied that no rule applies.
Analogical methods are not without risks.

A judges who

believes that analogies in themselves provide a ground for
decision may decide on the basis of an unexplained intuition of
similarity.52

Thus, Heidi might conclude that Martha’s pit bull

is “like” a German shepherd.

Alternatively, the judge may

construct a “legal principle” based largely on fit with prior
cases, and in doing so entrench past mistakes.53

If Martha’s pit

bull, unlike the pit bulls in prior cases, is a French pit bull,
Heidi might decide according to the principle that “European
guard dogs are nuisances in residential neighborhoods.”)
Restrictions on the Scope of Precedent Rules.

If judges are

not good rulemakers, it follows that they should be cautious in
announcing rules.

Ideally, they should avoid rulemaking only

when bias affects their judgment; but cognitive bias, by its
nature, is difficult for the reasoner to detect and cure.

As a

fallback, the safest course for judges may be to minimize the
impact of unsound precedent rules by limiting the scope of all
precedent rules.
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Established conventions restrict judicial rulemaking in
several ways.

We noted in Chapter Two that, in announcing

precedent rules, judges typically confine themselves to rules
that provide an answer to the dispute before the court.54

In a

dispute over Edward’s bear, Heidi will stop short of announcing a
rule about lawnmowing in residential neighborhoods, even if her
research on the subject of nuisances has convinced her that a
lawnmowing rule would be beneficial.

Judicial restraint in

promulgating rules is reinforced by prevailing methods of
interpreting prior opinions.

Later judges typically characterize

statements that are not necessary to explain the result of the
prior case as non-binding “dicta,” even if they take the form of
rules.55

Thus, if Heidi states in her opinion in Edward’s case

that residential landowners must mow their lawns on Saturday,
future judges will feel free to regard her statement as a stray
remark or at best a suggestion.
These limits on judicial rulemaking are not entailed by the
rule model, which confers rulemaking authority on judges without
qualification.56

Limits of this kinds, however, may be sensible

responses to the problems judicial rulemaking encounters.

A

self-imposed restraint against rulemaking on subjects that are
unrelated to the dispute at hand tends to result in narrow rules
and cautious development of common law.
Analogical methods can have a similar conservative effect on
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judicial rules.

We have argued that reasoning by analogy (as

opposed to purely intuitive analogical decisionmaking) amounts to
formulating and applying rules that support like treatment of
cases.57

Connections between the facts of past and present cases

are easiest to see and articulate at a low level of generality;
therefore, analogy-warranting rules tend to be modest and
concrete.58

For example: Heidi determines that Karl’s ocelot is

importantly similar to Edward’s bear, which a prior judge held to
be a nuisance.

She explains the likeness of the cases by

reference to a rule: “dangerous wild animals in residential
neighborhoods are nuisances.”

The same moral principles that

justify this rule might also justify a broader rule: “potentially
dangerous agents that are difficult to control are nuisances when
maintained in an area where they might cause serious personal
injury.”

This rule, however, does not capture the link between

Karl’s ocelot and Edward’s bear as effectively as the narrower
dangerous-wild-animal rule.

The broader rules also calls for a

much wider search of prior cases to test the rule against
outcomes within its range.59
choose the narrower form.

Therefore, Heidi is likely to

If the resulting rule is unsound, the

harm it causes will be correspondingly small.
Distinguishing and Overruling.

The rule model of judicial

decisionmaking has no conceptual room for the practice of
distinguishing rules.

Precedent rules are serious rules, meaning
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that judges must either follow them according to their terms,
without reference to the underlying moral principles they are
designed to implement, or overrule them.

At the same time, the

rule model itself does not limit the power to overrule: judges
have authority to make rules, and therefore judges have authority
to replace or eliminate rules.

Ideally, judges will overrule

precedent rules only when the existing rule is either unjustified
or suboptimal as a rule - that is, when it causes more error than
it prevents or performs less well than an alternative rule - and
only when the harm to expectations and coordination from
overruling or the prospect of overruling does not militate in
favor of retaining a suboptimal rule.60

When sound rules appear

to prescribe mistaken results, judges should leave them in place
and decide as they require.
As we have noted, however, the ideal standard for
overruling, as just described, is difficult if not impossible for
judges to apply.

Unjustified rules are logically distinct from

justified rules that produce erroneous outcomes; psychologically,
however, it is hard to separate the two.

Cognitive heuristics

exacerbate the problem: the availability and affective power of
live parties and narrative facts will illuminate an unappealing
outcome in the case before the court and obscure the more
abstract benefits of upholding a sound rule.61

An artificial

presumption in favor of rule-following might counteract the
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effects of compelling facts, but applying such a presumption is
not rational.

Why should a judge follow a precedent rule when

the judge believes the balance favors overruling?
The stance that judges traditionally have taken toward
precedent rules is rather different from what the rule model
recommends.

Judges tend to be cautious in overruling precedent

rules; at least, they do not repeal rules at will in the manner
of a legislature.

On the other hand, they commonly distinguish

precedent rules, carving out exceptions based on factual
differences between the current case and past cases in which the
rule was applied.62
As we have said, distinguishing is not a form of partial
rule-following.

For the reasons outlined in Chapter Three, when

a judge distinguishes a precedent rule, that rule has no impact
on the outcome of the pending case or the content of the
“modified” rule.

Nor do the facts of prior cases applying the

rule constrain the outcome of the pending case.

Distinguishing

is based on factual disanalogies that, like analogies, have no
independent rational force.

Either disanalogies are purely

intuitive, or they stem from a rule that identifies important
differences among cases.

Ultimately, therefore, there is no

constraint on the ability of judges to distinguish rules if
distinguishing is permitted: distinguishing rules is logically
equivalent to repealing rules at will.63
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As a practice, however, distinguishing differs in one
important way from simple overruling of precedent rules.

Before

distinguishing a rule, the judge studies and compares the facts
of past cases applying the rule.

In the process, the judge is

likely to encounter at least one and probably more than one
concrete example in which the rule performed well.

Just as

seeking analogies helps judges assess the consequences of rules
beyond a single case, the practice of distinguishing may enable
judges to perceive more easily the benefits of adhering to
precedent rules.
For example: Heidi is considering the case of Edward’s bear.
A prior opinion, in a nuisance suit against Walter, announced the
rule that “bears in residential neighborhoods are nuisances per
se.”

Heidi believes that the purposes of this rule do not apply

to Edward’s bear, a gentle retired circus animal that has lived
uneventfully in Edward’s home for years.
distinguishing Edward’s case.

So she sets about

To do this, she reads descriptions

of facts provided by the judge in Walter’s case: Walter’s pet
bear escaped and wandered into a school cafeteria, frightening
children and teachers.

She also consults the description of

facts in a later case that applied the no-bear rule in a nuisance
action against Charles: Charles’s bear, which had previously been
well-behaved, clawed a representative of a charitable
organization canvassing door-to door.
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At this point, Heidi is

still free to distinguish Edward’s case: Edward may keep his bear
in an especially sturdy cage, and Walter’s and Charles’s bears
may never have worked in the circus.

But the facts of the prior

cases provide competing narratives that demonstrate the value of
an unqualified no-bear rule in a manner that is more likely to
influence Heidi’s deliberations than abstract arguments about
error prevention and coordination.

As a result, Heidi may be

less tempted to distinguish (and thereby overrule) the rule.
The practice of distinguishing precedent rules is dangerous
to the stability of rules because it creates an illusion of
modesty.

Judges may intervene more often when they believe they

are merely modifying, rather than overruling, established rules.
Yet, if judges cannot reliably separate faulty rules from
regrettable outcomes, a set of conventions by which judges
hesitate to “overrule” but are willing to “distinguish” may be
the next-best solution.

Erroneous rules are not permanently

entrenched, but judges normally will not overrule rules without
first consulting examples that counteract the tendency to
overrule in response to engaging facts.
Summary: Corrective Practices.

Judges traditionally have

engaged in a number of practices that are not required by the
rule model of the common law and in some cases appear to
contradict either the rule model itself or the related assumption
that judicial reasoning is nothing other than ordinary moral and
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empirical reasoning and deduction from rules.

Judges seek

analogies; they avoid rules that are not necessary to the outcome
of a pending case and dismiss unnecessary rules as dicta; they
purport to distinguish precedent rules based on factual
differences among cases.

In our view, these practices do not

embody a special form of legal reasoning: apart from their effect
in narrowing the pool of eligible precedent rules, they do not
determine the outcomes of judicial decisionmaking.

They become

more understandable, however, when viewed as indirect strategies
that counteract the disadvantages of judges as rulemakers.

The

task of adjudication can lead judges to formulate rules
infelicitously; the practices we have described may serve,
partially and imperfectly, to correct the effects of adjudication
on rulemaking.
We offer this suggestion cautiously.

The potential benefits

we have attributed to otherwise mysterious judicial practices are
possibilities, not empirically verified and not without
accompanying risks to the stability of precedent rules.

If our

speculations are correct, however, the relationship between these
practices and judicial rulemaking helps to reconcile the rule
model of decisionmaking with the conventional behavior of lawyers
and judges.

Rationality and Sustainability of Judicial Practice
28

Certain conventional judicial practices - seeking analogies
with past decisions, avoiding or disregarding rules that are not
necessary to the outcome of a pending case, and distinguishing
precedent rules - may help to improve the quality of judicial
rules or limit the damage done by rules that are infelicitous.
We have already noted several concerns about these practices.
Analogical methods invite intuitive judgment and, to the extent
they constrain judicial decisionmaking, can entrench error.
Restrictions on the scope of precedent rules limit the
opportunity for settlement.

Distinguishing precedent rules,

which is really overruling precedent rules, can undermine the
settlement value of existing rules.
Apart from these potential adverse consequences, the
conventional practices we have mentioned suffer from two problems
of a deeper kind.

First, although their most plausible virtues

lie in their capacity to prevent or contain the errors of
judicial rulemaking, this is not why judges pursue them.

Judges

engage in these practices because they believe they are the best
way to decide cases.

In other words, judges have, in a sense,

tricked themselves into adopting what might well be good
rulemaking habits.

This state of affairs is hard to reconcile

with the ideal of legal decisionmaking as a publicly accessible
process based on reason.
The element of unreason is most evident in the case of
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analogical decisionmaking: judges deciding by analogy purport to
resolve disputes on grounds that are logically unavailable.
Conventions that restrict judicial rulemaking to rules that
explain the outcome of adjudication are more straightforward, but
they treat a cautionary strategy as a limit on judicial power.
The practice of distinguishing precedent rules disguises
overruling as something more modest.

In each case, the practice

in question is justifiable, if at all, for reasons of which
practioners are unaware.
Indirection and self-deception are common enough in law.64
Rules themselves illustrate this point.

As we noted in Chapter

One, legal rules serve moral values indirectly.

Rules reduce the

errors of natural reasoning by prescribing answers in a form that
will sometimes yield the wrong results.

As a consequence,

following rules means acting against the balance of reasons in
some cases.
rational.

Acting against the balance of reasons is not
Therefore, to accept the authority of rules, one must

convince oneself that following the rule is the right thing to do
in every case, even though it is not.65

Self-deception of this

kind allows rules to perform the morally valuable function of
settling controversy, but it is nevertheless disturbing.

Any

departure from reasoned decisionmaking, even if justifiable on
reasoned grounds, is a cause for regret.
More practically, because the conventional judicial
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practices we have described involve self-deception and
irrationality, they are also unstable.

If lawyers and judges

come to understand that conventional practices are not rationally
defensible on their own terms, they may cease to accept those
practices, and whatever benefits conventional practices hold for
rulemaking will be lost.

Analogical reasoning appears to be

firmly established at present: our critical analysis of
analogical methods is not likely to prevail over pervasive legal
training and professional acceptance.

Careful factual

comparisons, however, may eventually give way to quicker workbased searches for applicable rules.66

Judicial diffidence in

rulemaking may be more vulnerable, as judges come to accept that
they possess a full complement of rulemaking power.

There are

also indications that courts have become more comfortable with
direct overruling of precedent rules, and therefore may be less
likely to search past cases for distinguishing facts.67
The common law, therefore, stands on movable ground.

The

rule model of judicial decisionmaking, which allows the common
law to function as law and settle controversy, is defensible only
when judicial rules are justified as rules, and only when
judicial rules are generally followed.

Rule-following depends on

the willingness of judges and actors to apply rules even when the
results the rules prescribe conflict with their own best
judgment.

To the extent that practices we have discussed in this
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chapter are important to the quality of judicial rules, the
justification of precedent rules also depends in part on
conventional attitudes and practices of judges.

It follows that

perfect rationality can subvert the conditions for sound and
effective common law.
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